The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France

A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Francesco Ragazzi
Stephan Davidshofer
Sarah Perret
Amal Tawfik

CENTRE D'ETUDE SUR LES CONFLITS,
LIBERTE, SECURITE (CCLS)

PARIS 2019

The Effects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Radicalisation Policies on Muslim Populations in France

A QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Francesco Ragazzi
Centre for Research on Conflicts, Liberty, and Security (CCLS) and Leiden University
Stephan Davidshofer
Centre for Research on Conflicts, Liberty, and Security (CCLS) and University of Geneva (InCite/GSI)
Sarah Perret
Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS Paris), Chair in Geopolitics of Risk
Amal Tawfik
University of Geneva (InCite)

CENTRE D'ETUDE SUR LES CONFLITS,
LIBERTE, SECURITE (CCLS)

PARIS 2019

Updated version, 1 July 2019

Key points of the report

I. Muslims in France are a heterogeneous group subject to discrimination

- This study is based on a sample of 927 interviews: 426 with people who identify as Muslim and 501 with people who have no connection with Islam.
- The Muslim sample differs from the control group in terms of age distribution (the Muslim respondents are younger overall), professional situation (more non-working people such as students, fewer retirees, more lower-level employees and workers in routine occupations), religious practice (more frequent) and political position (more to the left).
- Overall, respondents from the Muslim sample trusts French state and social institutions (the army, social security, school, council, justice system, etc.) as much as, or slightly more than, the control group. Muslim respondents place politics and the media at the bottom of the trust scale, as does the control group. There are two institutions that Muslims trust less than the control group does: law enforcement and the media.
- Muslims feel discriminated against in all areas covered by this study (health, school, housing, policing, employment, daily life), and to a much greater degree than non-Muslims: 2.2 times more when looking for housing; 3.2 times more at school; 5.3 times more in interactions with the police.

II. Individuals experience the same exposure to counter-terrorism measures, but Muslims feel they are deliberately selected and treated worse by the authorities

- Overall, the Muslim group feels exposed to counter-terrorism (through law enforcement) and counter-radicalisation (through youth workers and social workers) as much as the control group.
- The Muslim sample even reports slightly less contact with the police and gendarmerie for counter-terrorism than the control sample. However, young Muslim men report being in contact with youth workers twice as much.
- Muslims and non-Muslims consider the contact with youth workers and social workers to be justified as a whole; however, police stops appear less justified to Muslims, who feel they are treated significantly worse than the control group does.
- Many Muslim respondents feel stigmatised by counter-terrorism: they say they are deliberately chosen in interactions with police and public officials related to counter-terrorism, most often because of their origin or skin colour (2.5 times more than the control group).

III. Muslims perceive counter-terrorism as targeting their community

- Muslims and non-Muslims reply similarly when asked whether counter-terrorism policies provide them with a sense of security. Both groups find the policies moderately effective (average score of 5.9 on a scale of 0 to 10).
- Responses vary according to age, however: young Muslims feel less safe than non-Muslims their age, whereas Muslims aged 45-64 feel safer than non-Muslims in the same age group.
- Muslims and non-Muslims consider overall that counter-terrorism has little impact on their privacy. This feeling is more prevalent among young people.
- Two-thirds of Muslim respondents and three-quarters of the control group believe that counter-terrorism predominantly targets certain groups. Half of the respondents consider that the choice of target depends on religion.
- More Muslim respondents (over twice as many) find this targeting totally unjustified or insufficiently justified than control group respondents (34.4% compared to 15.1%). Conversely, fewer Muslims find this targeting reasonably or totally justified (31.9% compared to 43.5%).

IV. Counter-terrorism has a significant impact on behaviour

- About one in three Muslims claim to "avoid saying what they think" about controversial topics related to foreign policy (30.6%) or society (30.5%). Yet the control group's attitude is not very different. Self-censorship therefore appears across the board and is more pronounced among Muslims.
- 79.8% of Muslims and 84.4% of the control group say they have not changed their habits to protect their online privacy. This means, however, that the minority who say they are careful is twice as large among Muslims (9.2% compared to 5%).
- Counter-terrorism has very little impact on the most visible aspects of religion, such as clothing (traditional dress, hijab, or headscarf). 86.7% of Muslims say they have not changed the way they dress. However, the percentage of Muslims who say they have changed the way they dress (8.5%) is five times higher than respondents of the control group (1.6%).
- More than a third of Muslims (38.5%) say they no longer read or watch certain media outlets because of these outlets' approach to Islam. This is particularly true for young people (41.9%). The figure increases further (43.7%) when it comes to media coverage of terrorism-related issues.
- About a quarter of respondents (26.1%) say they are careful about what they say to youth workers and social workers for fear of being discriminated against. Fewer claim to be similarly careful about what they say to doctors and nurses (19.7%).
- In addition, 41.7% of Muslims aged 45-64 say they ask their children to "be careful what they say at school" to avoid discrimination.
- Counter-terrorism has a significant impact on Muslim charities: almost one-third of Muslims (36.9%) say they "think twice before donating to a charity".

V. Feeling discriminated against fosters self-isolation and erodes trust

- Having experienced discrimination in the past five years systematically lowers scores for trust in institutions: the more someone has been discriminated against, the less trust they have in institutions—all institutions combined.
- Although this general trend concerns both the control group and the Muslim group, it is systematically more pronounced among Muslims.
- The factor that significantly affects trust is not religion, age, social class, or gender, but being discriminated against.
- Muslims who have been subjected to discrimination are more likely to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures. Muslims' greater propensity to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures is therefore not due to their being Muslim, but to the fact that Muslims are over-represented among victims of discrimination.

VI. Recommendations

- Muslims in France are not a homogeneous community. In many respects they are no different from the control group. They do, however, face more discrimination.
- Discrimination must be tackled to strengthen the legitimacy of counter-terrorism policies and their respect for civil liberties.
- Tackling discrimination must be a priority if Muslims' trust in French political and social institutions is to be maintained.
- Further reflection is needed on how to build more equable relations between the police and the public.
- Efforts must be made to improve media coverage of issues related to Islam and terrorism.

Contents

Tables and Figures

Tables

Figures

Introduction

Why is this study necessary?

What effect do counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies have on Muslim populations in France? Do French Muslims perceive these policies as discriminatory? Although a number of qualitative studies, civil society organisations, and political groups have raised these questions before, there are currently no figures available to serve as a basis for a real debate on this issue in France. This study aims to fill that gap.

Since the attacks of January and November 2015, the terrorist threat has taken centre stage in French public debate. The issue had never entirely disappeared; the attacks committed by Mohammed Merah in March 2012 followed on from the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005.

The 2015 attacks share a common feature that sets them apart from September 11: most of the attackers did not come from abroad but were born on French or European soil. They grew up in the outskirts or working-class neighbourhoods of large French cities, were educated in French schools, and had often been through French social services—sometimes French prison. This marked a turning point in the focus of counter-terrorism policies. Now, in addition to protecting borders and guarding against the "external threat", there is an "internal threat" to detect and prevent.

This shift towards the detection and prevention of what has been labelled "radicalisation"– one that began in the second half of the 2000s in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands — has put the Muslims of France in the spotlight. Debates on secularism, wearing the hijab, or on certain strict religious practices, which preceded those on terrorism, have become mixed up with the security debate. It is in this specific context that we decided to undertake our research on the effects of counter-terrorism policies on Muslims in France.

Counter-terrorism policies in France

For a long time, French counter-terrorism has been based chiefly on a judicial approach geared towards anticipation. Since 1986, it has been structured around active collaboration between specialist counter-terrorism judges and police units. Counter-terrorism legislation allows the courts to apply exceptional measures for any offence committed "in connection with a terrorist enterprise". For years, the French counter-terrorism apparatus focused on gathering intelligence, infiltrating terrorist groups, and dismantling networks.

The 1986 Act "on the fight against terrorism and breaches of State security" shaped the legislative arsenal of counter-terrorism.[1] Adopted following a wave of attacks linked to the situation in the Middle East, it introduced exceptional measures, allowing police to detain suspects in custody for up to 96 hours, for instance, or to refuse them access to a lawyer for up to 72 hours. The Act has been updated twice: first in 1992 with the adoption of new penal code (in force in 1994) that specifies the exceptional procedures applicable to terrorist cases; and again in 1996, after another wave of attacks in 1995 that were attributed to the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (GIA).[2]

New measures were adopted after the September 11 attacks in 2001 to increase the scope of police action. Then, in 2006, the legislation was strengthened with the Act "on the fight against terrorism and containing various provisions related to security and border controls".[3] Among other things, this Act brought video surveillance into widespread use and turned the offence of "criminal association in connection with a terrorist enterprise" into a crime carrying a possible 20-year prison sentence.

---

[1] Légifrance (1986), "Loi n° 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l'Etat": https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JORFTEXT000000693912.

[2] Légifrance (1992), "Loi n° 92-1336 du 16 décembre 1992 relative à l'entrée en vigueur du nouveau code pénal et à la modification de certaines dispositions de droit pénal et de procédure pénale rendue nécessaire par cette entrée en vigueur": https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000177662&categorieLien=id. Légifrance (1996), "Loi n° 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 tendant à renforcer la répression du terrorisme et des atteintes aux personnes dépositaires de l'autorité publique ou chargées d'une mission de service public et comportant des dispositions relatives à la police judiciaire": https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000367689&categorieLien=id.

[3] Légifrance (2006), "Loi n° 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers": https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000454124&categorieLien=id.

Yet the 2012 attacks committed by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse called judges' and police forces' monopoly on counter-terrorism into question. New thinking captured in a 2013 report by Prefect Yann Jounot had the French government review its position.[4]

The new approach, announced in 2014, introduced France to the idea of a "fight against radicalisation". In doing so, it took up a series of measures developed in Netherlands as part of its "comprehensive approach" (*brede benadering*) and in the UK as part of the Prevent programme of its Contest counter-terrorism strategy.[5] This perspective mobilises the whole of society (community-based organisations, mosques) and the state services that deal with much of the population (state education system, social services, health services, prisons). A toll-free number was set up for citizens to report potentially radicalised individuals. The prefectures were also mobilised to liaise with local Muslim authorities, and to coordinate any reports made by public-sector employees in the education system, hospitals, social services and prisons, through several *Etat-majors de sécurité* (EMS) or joint security command. In addition, after the January 2015 attacks, the state pursued the idea of ideological counter-narrative through efforts including the launch of the website Stop-djihadisme.fr.

The new approach was codified in May 2016 with the adoption of a national strategy, the "Counter-Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Action Plan" (*Plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme*, or PART). The plan covers seven main areas: detection, surveillance and neutralisation; combating international terrorism; intensifying the prevention of radicalisation with personalised case management; developing applied research on "counter-narratives" and involving representatives of French Islam; improving the protection of vulnerable sites and networks; and, finally, knowing how to react to attacks and strengthen the nation's resilience.[6] Thus the plan asks Muslim "authorities" or "representatives" in France to take responsibility for the violence committed in the name of Islam.

This did not, however, mean a replacement of the judicial approach. To the contrary, on 16 November 2015, the French authorities declared the state of emergency, introducing new possibilities for house searches and house arrests, reinforcing surveillance of critical facilities and military arsenals, and stepping up the prevention of radicalisation and the

---

[4] Yann Jounot (2016), "Prévention de la radicalisation", SGDSN report, in *Mediapart*, "Terrorisme : un rapport confidentiel-défense condamnait en 2013 le tout-sécuritaire", 11 January 2016: https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2016/01/12/295128767-rapport-jounot.pdf (consulted on 26 May 2018).

[5] On the development of these policies, see Francesco Ragazzi (2014) *Vers un" multiculturalisme policier"?: la lutte contre la radicalisation en France, aux Pays Bas et au Royaume-Uni*. Centre d'études et de recherches internationales, Paris.

[6] Third Valls government, "Plan d'action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme", *Press release*, 9 May 2016: https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2016/05/09.05.2016_dossier_de_presse_-_plan_daction_contre_la_radicalisation_et_le_terrorisme.pdf.

recruitment of security and surveillance personnel.[7] The state of emergency and its many extensions met with a broad political consensus and parliamentary support.[8]

Yet its repeated extension has raised several legal and political problems, which the French Human Rights Commission (*Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme*), among others, has made public.[9] The Commission highlighted the misuse of measures applicable under the state of emergency which, in practice, do not only target individuals likely to belong to a terrorist movement. Indeed, Muslims who practice their religion conservatively but non-violently have been the first to suffer from the arbitrary effects of the state of emergency. The vast majority of legal experts and academics concerned with the issue have repeatedly denounced the repeated, long-term implementation of exceptional measures and the problems this poses for democracy.[10] The government in power since May 2017 has chosen to continue this course of action.

The effects of counter-terrorism

The current situation — escalating security measures coupled with the expanding scope of counter-terrorism, from a targeted legal and police practice to prevention efforts aimed at a much wider audience — raises pressing questions about the impacts of counter-terrorism. Are the "reporting" logic, the demands to reform Islam, and more generally the recurrent association in public debate between Islam, Islamism and terrorism generating feelings of discrimination and exclusion among Muslim populations in France?

---

[7] Ludovic Jeanne (2017), "Les enjeux du recrutement pour les services de renseignement français", *The Conversation*, 6 June 2017: https://theconversation.com/les-enjeux-du-recrutement-pour-les-services-de-renseignement-francais-78505 (consulted on 30 May 2018).

[8] Analysis of vote No. 1191, "Public vote on the bill extending the application of Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency and strengthening its provisions' effectiveness (first reading)", First session of 19/11/2015: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/%28legislature%29/14/%28num%29/1191. And, Analysis of vote No. 2, "Public vote on the bill extending the application of Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency (first reading)", *Second session on* 06/07/2017: http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/scrutins/detail/(legislature)/15/(num)/2.

[9] CNCDH (2017), "Avis sur le suivi de l'état d'urgence et les mesures antiterroristes de la loi du 21 juillet 2016", ("Opinion on the continued state of emergency and counter-terrorism measures under the Act of 21 July 2016"), 26 January 2017: http://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/170126_avis_suivi_de_letat_durgence_et_mesures_antiterroristes.pdf.

[10] Cf. "The July 12 Appeal" by academics against the normalisation of the state of emergency, in *Libération* and *Médiapart*: http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2017/07/12/banalisation-de-l-etat-d-urgence-une-menace-pour-l-etat-de-droit_1583331 (consulted on 12 May 2018); or Vanessa Codaccioni (2018), "L'Etat d'urgence en France: profilage et régime d'exception discriminatoire", in MONITOR, January: http://monitoracism.eu/etat-durgence-en-france/ (consulted on 12 May 2018). See also the Senate's critical report on counter-radicalisation policies: Esther Benbassa and Catherine Troendlé (2017), "Rapport final de la mission d'information sur le désendoctrinement, le désembrigadement et la réinsertion des djihadistes en France et en Europe", *Commission des Lois du Sénat*, 12 July 2017: http://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201707/rapport_final_de_la_mission_dinformation_sur_le_desendoctrinement_le_desembrigadement_et_la_reinsertion_des_djihadistes_en_france_et_en_europe.html (consulted on 28 August 2018).

A number of researchers have investigated the effects of counter-terrorism policies. Often, these studies provide a detailed picture of individual cases or of small groups, obtained mainly through qualitative methods (ethnography, and individual or group interviews).[11] So far, they have particularly focused on the UK, although there are a few comparative studies.[12]

These studies — drawing mainly on critical sociological approaches — often argue that counter-terrorism policies have a performative effect: they contribute to the construction of a "Muslim" identity, grounded in a feeling of discrimination and targeting. Although not all of this literature is based on an explicit theoretical framework, it contributes to the debates on "state racism" and the question of "risk".[13] Most studies concur, however, that Muslims do not perceive counter-terrorism in Europe in as an isolated experience, but rather as being part of a "suspect community".[14] The work of Pantazis and Pemberton, which

---

[11] For an ethnographic study, see Victoria Brittain (2009), "Besieged in Britain", *Race & Class* 50(3): 1–29. Studies based on individual interviews include Leda Blackwood, Nick Hopkins and Stephen Reicher (2016), "From Theorizing Radicalization to Surveillance Practices: Muslims in the Cross Hairs of Scrutiny", *Political Psychology*, vol. 37 (5): 597-61; and Laura Zahra Mcdonald (2011), "Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for Security", *Religion, State and Society*, 39 (2-3): 177-189. Studies based on collective interviews include Imran Awan (2012), "'I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist': How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a "Suspect" Community", *Politics & Policy*, 40 (6): 1158–1185; Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick (2011), "The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities", *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, 25 (3): 151-18 ; Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister (2013), "Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Anti-Terrorism Policy on Citizenship in the UK", *Political Studies,* Vol. 61-3: 656–675; Arun Kundnani (2009), *Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism*, London, Institute of Race Relations; Mark McGovern and Angela Tobin (2010), *Countering Terror or Counter-Productive: Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-Insurgency Law and Policy*, Ormskirk, Edge Hill University; and Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate (2009), "'I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a Terrorist': Victimization, Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety", *British Journal of Criminology,* 49 (6): 736-754.

[12] L. Jarvis Lee and M. Lister, *op. cit.*; G. Mythen and S. Walklate, *op cit.*; Stephen Vertigans (2010), "British Muslims and the UK Government's "War on Terror" Within: Evidence of a Clash of Civilizations or Emergent De-Civilizing Processes?", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1): 26–44. For a comparative approach, see Anika Haverig (2013), "Managing Integration: German and British Policy Responses to the 'Threat from Within' Post-2001", *Journal of International Migration and Integration,* 14 (2): 345-362; Scott Poynting and Barbara Perry (2007), "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11", *Current Issues Criminal Justice*, HeinOnline, 19 (2): 360-380; and Basia Spalek and Alia Imtoual (2007), "Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: 'Hard' Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,* 27 (2): 185–202.

[13] V. Brittain, *op. cit.*; Liz Fekete (2004), "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State", *Race & Class* 46 (1): 3–29. Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2012), "Reinventing Prevention or Exposing the Gap? False Positives in UK Terrorism Governance and the Quest for Pre-Emption", *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5 (1): 69–87; Gabe Mythen, Sandra Walklate and Fatima Khan (2012), "'Why Should We Have to Prove We're Alright?': Counter-Terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities", *Sociology*, vol. 47 (2): 383-398; Gabe Mythen, Sandra Walklate and Elizabeth Jane Peatfield (2017), "Assembling and Deconstructing Radicalisation in PREVENT: A Case of Policy-Based Evidence Making?", *Critical Social Policy*, SAGE Publications UK: London, 37 (2): 180–201.

[14] T. Choudhury and H. Fenwick, *op. cit.*

builds on and updates Paddy Hilyard's research on the effects of counter-terrorism, is particularly representative of this approach.[15] They hold that Muslims have replaced the Irish as a "suspect community" in the UK. Although the theoretical debate is unresolved, these studies have constituted a rich store of qualitative empirical material, which for the moment is almost non-existent in France. The main critique that can be made of them, however, pertains to the lack of generalizability of their results. This methodological limitation is precisely what our study attempts to rectify.

In France, very few studies directly or indirectly address the effects of counter-terrorism, particularly in terms of individual experience and collective perceptions. Existing research focuses primarily on the genealogy of counter-terrorism, its legal aspects, or on qualitative case studies.[16] The literature on Islam in France is mainly historical or based in qualitative sociology.[17] Quantitative studies focus on discrimination against immigrant populations, on

---

[15] Christina Pantazis and Simon Pemberton (2009), "From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation", *British Journal of Criminology*, Oxford University Press 49 (5): 646–666.

[16] Raphaelle Camilleri (2012), *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report*, London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue; Mathieu Rigouste (2014), *L'ennemi intérieur : la généalogie coloniale et militaire de l'ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine*, Paris, La Découverte; Peter Frank (2008), Political Rationalities, "Counter-Terrorism and Policies on Islam in the United Kingdom and France", in Julia M. Eckert (ed.), *The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws: The War on Terror and the Classifications of the "Dangerous Others"*, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 79–108. There is also a grey literature from the non-profit sector: Yasser Louati (2015), "L'Exception Francaise: From Irrational Fear of Muslims to their Social Death Sentence", *Islamophobia Studies Journal,* Vol. 3 (1): 90-105; see also reports by the CCIF, for example (2018), *Rapport sur l'islamophobie pendant l'année 2017 : Dates, chiffres et questions*: http://www.islamophobie.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ccif-rapport-2018.pdf (consulted on 20 September 2018); or by Amnesty international (2017), *Des mesures disproportionnées, L'ampleur grandissante des politiques sécuritaires dans les pays de l'UE est dangereuse*: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0153422017FRENCH.PDF (consulted on 10 August 2018). See also the activities of the Observatoire de l'Islamophobie: https://observatoireislamophobie.wordpress.com/ (consulted on 20 September 2018); and publications by the association Action Droit des Musulmans (2017), *Avis sur le projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme*, 28 September 2017: http://adm1.unblog.fr/2017/09/28/adm-avis-sur-le-projet-de-loi-renforcant-la-securite-interieure-et-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme/ (consulted on 20 September 2018).

[17] It would be difficult here to mention all the existing research. We would, however, like to note Jocelyne Césari (2004), *L'islam à l'épreuve de l'occident*, Paris, La Découverte; Bruno Etienne (2003), *Islam, les questions qui fâchent*, Paris, Bayard; Vincent Geisser (1997), *Ethnicité républicaine : les élites d'origine maghrébine dans le système politique français*, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po; Gilles Kepel (1987), *Les banlieues de l'islam*, Paris, Le seuil; Riva Kastoryano (2004), "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany", *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 1234–1255; Marcel Maussen (2006), "Representing and Regulating Islam in France and in the Netherlands", *Muslims in Europe and in the United States Conference*, Harvard University, 15-16 December: 1–16; Vincent Geisser and Aziz Zemouri (2007), *Marianne et Allah. Les politiques français face à la question musulmane*, Paris, La Découverte; Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse (2007), *Intégrer l'islam : la France et ses musulmans, enjeux et réussites*, Paris, Odile Jacob; Sophie Body-Gendrot (2013), "Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France, A Comparative Framework", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 36 (7): 1257–1258 ; Franck Frégosi (2008), *Penser l'islam dans la laicité*, Paris, Fayard; Rémy Leveau, Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (eds.) (2001)*, L'islam en France et en Allemagne : identités et citoyennetés,* Paris, La Documentation Française; Jonathan Laurence & Justin Vaisse (2007), *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*,

the relationship between racialised minorities and law enforcement, or on other issues concerning Muslim populations.[18]

After the 2005 uprisings triggered by the death of two teenagers of postcolonial immigrant backgrounds in Clichy-sous-Bois, several studies were conducted to try to understand the troubled assimilation of populations with immigrant parents or grandparents. One such study is the "Trajectoires et origines" survey, a joint undertaking by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the French National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED), first conducted in 2008 and 2009. The book based on the survey results, edited by Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon, points out that the question of discrimination cannot be "postulated, it must be measured".[19] The 2010 report presenting the initial findings highlighted that descendants of North African and sub-Saharan African immigrants expressed considerable distrust in police institutions, often due to their having been stopped and questioned several times by police in a single year.[20]

Also worth noting is "The Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey" (EU-MIDIS II) published by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2018. Significantly, it shows that ten years after the first survey, the feeling of discrimination expressed by immigrants who self-identify as Muslims, and by their children born in the EU, has not changed and remains strong.[21] Thus, recent studies emphasise the extent of discrimination felt either by Muslim populations or by groups considered by others to be Muslim, namely people of North African, Turkish, sub-Saharan or Caribbean origin.

Brookings Institution Press; Jocelyne Cesari (2002), "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority", in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*: 36-51; Valérie Amiraux (2001), *Acteurs de l'islam entre Allemagne et Turquie : Parcours militants et expériences religieuses*, Paris, Editions L'Harmattan.

[18] Mirna Safi and Patrick Simon (2013), "Les discriminations ethniques et raciales dans l'enquête Trajectoires et Origines représentations, expériences subjectives et situations vécues", *Economie et statistique,* 464 (1): 245–275. For the latest developments on the issue of racialised minorities and law enforcement, see Guillaume Roux (2017), "Expliquer le rejet de la police en banlieue : discriminations, 'ciblage des quartiers' et racialisation. Un état de l'art", *Droit et société*, 97 (3) ; and, in particular, Fabien Jobard and René Lévy (eds.) (2009), *Police et minorités visibles : le contrôle d'identité à Paris*, New York, Open Society Institute: http://www.cnrs.fr/inshs/recherche/docs-actualites/rapport-facies.pdf. On other issues, see Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj (2005) *Français comme les autres : Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque,* Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques; Patrick Simon and Vincent Tiberj (2013) *Sécularisation ou regain religieux : La religiosité des immigrés et de leurs descendants,* Paris, Institut national d'études démographiques.

[19] Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon (2016), "Trajectoires et Origines : Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France", INED éditions, 15.

[20] Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon (2010), "Trajectoires et Origines : Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France - Premiers résultats", in *Enquête TeO,* INED, October 2010, 110-111; Fabien Jobard and René Lévy (Dir.) (2009), *op.cit.*

[21] Cf. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018), "Chapter 4. Racism, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance", in European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2018) *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey.* Luxemburg, Publication Office. http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2015/eu-midis-ii-second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey.

Quantitative data for public debate

The objective of this report is to overcome the current lack of specific data on the effect of counter-terrorism policies on populations and thereby inform academic discussion and a public debate that is yet to really get underway. We see several possible reasons for this lack of data.

The first is that the terror attacks are still too fresh in people's minds. Discussions are currently focused on the important and legitimate issue of prevention. How can counter-terrorism policy be made more effective? How can future attacks be prevented? How can the prison situation be dealt with? What should be done with people suspected of posing a serious threat to national security—in France, those flagged with a "fiche S"? Such questions abound and occupy all political and civil society stakeholders. Nonetheless, we must now look ahead to the period following the security emergency. Once the terrorist threat dissipates — as historically it always has — in what condition will French society find itself, and how will France's Muslim population feel? Current policies are engaged in providing an adequate security response, and legitimately so. But are they having a negative impact on social cohesion, which is the foundation not only of a working democracy, but also of an effective prevention policy over the long-term?

The second reason for the absence of debate on these issues is a lack of figures to illustrate the phenomenon in a substantial way. So far, the counter-terrorism debate in France has focused on arguments of legal principle regarding the threat that security measures may pose to civil liberties. It has been supported by examples based on media coverage of individual cases that are particularly striking for their injustice or excesses. Yet it is easy to pit one example against another, or to call out the unrepresentative nature of personal situations. In these conditions, informed debate is impossible. The purpose of this study, therefore, is first to inform the authorities, particularly those involved in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation, so they can gauge the effects of their policy and practices. And, second, to inform civil society organisations so they can build up an overall vision that allows them to place the specific cases they encounter in their day-to-day work in a broader context.

Methodology

Research questions

The research questions for this study were as follows:

What is the effect of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies on people who identify as Muslim in France? Do these policies give rise to feelings of discrimination?
The terms need to be clarified. First and foremost, it is not a matter of focusing on terrorism itself or on the support that part of the population is presumed to show for the activities of terrorist groups, or indeed of trying to identify the alleged propensity of certain parts of the

population to engage in terrorism themselves — a research agenda up for debate.[22] Nor is it a question of assessing how appropriate or effective counter-terrorism policies are — that is, their ability to effectively prevent or obstruct violent actions. The goal here is different; it is to try and understand the effect of the policies the government implements to combat terrorism, and, more particularly, their impact on feelings of discrimination among Muslim populations.

Second, we need to define what is meant by "Muslim populations". The studies cited above adopt various definitions of what is meant by a "Muslim" person. We chose to use an approach based on self-identification; that is, to include in the research sample only those who identify as Muslims.[23] In line with the work of Richard Jenkins and Rogers Brubaker, we consider that social identity is not fixed or essential; rather it is constructed through the interaction between forms of self-identification and external practices of categorisation.[24] This approach avoids a pitfall that occurs in a number of surveys, where researchers label respondents as "Muslim" because of objective variables such as place of birth, parents' place of birth or parents' religion. As mentioned above, this is to deny the fact that identification with the signifier "Muslim" is subjective and multidimensional; this identification can be religious (with Islam), traditional, family-based, political, or any combination of the above.[25] Yet people are also free to reject their social group of origin and the religion to which they are supposed to belong. Thus, the Muslim group in this survey excludes people who, while from Muslim families or countries, do not identify with this group. Finally, we choose to put the term in the plural–there is not a single Muslim population or community in France but, as our survey shows, a heterogeneous and diverse set.

Third, we must clarify what we mean by the relationship we are attempting to establish between counter-terrorism policies and Muslim populations in France. We start with a conscious working hypothesis — the discrimination angle — but with the objective of testing this hypothesis against the empirical data collected in the survey. This choice is

---

[22] See, for example, Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel (eds.) (2018), *La tentation radicale. Enquête auprès des lycéens*, Paris, PUF and the critical analysis proposed by Jean Baubérot (2018), "L'ouvrage 'La tentation radical' d'O. Galland et d'A. Muxel : une enquête défectueuse', in "Blog : Laïcité et regard critique sur la société", *Médiapart*, 10 April 2018: https://blogs.mediapart.fr/jean-bauberot/blog/100418/l-ouvrage-la-tentation-radicale-d-o-galland-et-d-muxel-une-enquete-defectueuse (consulted on 28 September 2018); or Hakim El Karoui (2016), *Un islam français est possible*, Report, Institut Montaigne, September 2016; and the paper by Jalila Sbai (2018), "Un projet aux relents coloniaux pour l'islam de France - "L'islam, une religion française" de Hakim El-Karoui", *Orient XXI*, 9 March: https://orientxxi.info/lu-vu-entendu/un-projet-aux-relents-coloniaux-pour-l-islam-de-france,2325 (consulted on 28 September 2018).

[23] On this point, see also Brouard and Tiberj, 2005, *op. cit.*

[24] Richard Jenkins (2014), *Social identity*, New York, Routledge. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000), "Beyond 'Identity'", *Theory and society*, 29 (1): 1-47.

[25] Nadia Jeldtoft (2011), "Lived Islam: religious identity with 'non-organized' Muslim minorities", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, n°1, 34 (7) : 1134-51. Rogers Brubaker (2013), "Categories of analysis and categories of practice: A note on the study of Muslims in European countries of immigration", in Ethnic and Racial Studies, n°1, 36 (1): 1-8.

justified by the specific and documented targeting of Muslim populations in France and Europe.[26] In this way, we aim for the survey to capture individual experiences, collective perceptions, and behavioural changes related to these policies. As a number of surveys have shown, and as ours shows (see Chapter 1), Muslim populations feel discriminated against more than the control group in many areas of daily life.[27] The starting point of the survey is therefore to find out whether counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies, which disproportionately target Muslims, contribute to this feeling of discrimination.

Finally, let us provide some definitions. In the questionnaire respondents were asked to complete, we define discrimination as "any form of treatment that has favoured or disadvantaged you on the grounds of one or more personal characteristics or choices—whether real or perceived—such as your origin, nationality, ethnicity or religion". This definition is shared by many academics and international bodies.[28] When we deal with discrimination specifically directed at Muslims, we use the definition of Islamophobia used by the French Human Rights Commission: "the systematic attitude of hostility towards Muslims, persons perceived as such and/or towards Islam". This is a similar definition to the one given by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, who define Islamophobia in their articles as the "complex social process of racialisation/othering based on (real or supposed) signs of belonging to the Muslim religion", which we find useful and effective.[29]

Strategy for designing the questionnaire

A participatory approach: establishment of an advisory committee

In order to take the viewpoint of the main stakeholders concerned by the survey into account, we established an "advisory committee" made up of representatives from organisations involved in both counter-terrorism and in combating discrimination and Islamophobia. The advisory committee was consulted on several occasions and provided valuable input into the design of the survey questionnaire and pre-tests. The aim of working with the committee was to preserve the scientific independence of research institutions while ensuring that the research findings were relevant to the policy-making debate.

---

[26] European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2018), *Second European Union minorities and discrimination survey*, Luxembourg, Publication Office: http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2015/eu-midis-ii-second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey (consulted on 12 September 2018).

[27] Claire Adida, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort (2010), "Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail", *Rapport de la Fondation franco-américaine et de Sciences Po*, Paris, Sciences Po.

[28] CNCDH (2018), *La lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et la xenophobie - Année 2017*, Paris, La Documentation Française.

[29] Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed (2013), *Islamophobie. Comment les élites françaises construisent le "problème musulman"*, Paris, La Découverte, p. 20.

Since affiliations can change rapidly in the non-profit sector, we indicate below the organisations on behalf of which the committee members participated in our research when the project was launched in 2016. Many of them are no longer affiliated with these organisations. The following people served on the advisory committee:

First name	Last name	Organisation	Full name of organisation
Sihame	Assbague	SCF	Stop le Contrôle au Faciès (currently a freelance journalist)
Nadia	Benmoussa		Villeneuve Saint Georges town council
Samia	Hathroubi	Coexister	Coexister & Foundation For Ethnic Understanding (formerly)
Yasser	Louati	CJL	Comité Justice et Libertés pour Tous[30]
Nonna	Mayer	CNCDH	Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de L'Homme (French Human Rights Commission)
Dhaou	Meskine		École la Réussite
Moungi	Rouaiguia	CRI	Coordination contre le Racisme et l'islamophobie - Marseille

Composition of the advisory committee, 2016

Results of collaboration with the committee

The comments of the advisory committee informed the research team's thinking. However, the final version of the questionnaire was based exclusively on scientific criteria. The questionnaire is divided into four parts. Part I, "General Questions", is designed to gather general information about the respondents' views of French society. Part II, "Experiences of Societal Discrimination" aims to place possible personal experiences of discrimination related to counter-terrorism within the broader context of societal discrimination. Part III focuses on perceptions of counter-terrorism policies in terms of their effectiveness and influence on individual behaviour. Part IV deals with the impact of counter-terrorism on respondents' daily lives, including possible behavioural changes. The final section collects demographic and general information on the respondents (for details, see the questionnaire in the appendix).

[30] Yasser Louati was spokesperson for the Collectif Contre l'Islamophobie en France (CCIF) until 2016, but had left the role a few months before he joined the advisory committee. The first version of this report, published on October 1, 2018, incorrectly stated that he represented CCIF on the committee. This error was the authors' responsibility alone and has been corrected in this version.

Constitution of the samples

Sampling method: the "sub-sample" method

When statistics are not available to establish quota and/or adjustment variables for a given target—as is the case for people of Muslim background or religion in France—the most valid methodological procedure is to survey this target within a larger sample for which recent, reliable data are available. This is the so-called "sub-sample" method, which IFOP used for this survey. In studies such as these, carried out on a sub-sample extracted from a representative national sample, the quota variables and adjustment variables are set for the overall sample based on INSEE data available for all adults residing in metropolitan France. In this setup, it is the quality of the overall sample that guarantees the representativeness of the sub-sample.

Sub-sampling is quite common practice, including for targets with penetration rates below 10%. Admittedly, below this threshold it can be risky because the greater the distortion between the two spheres (the one targeted and the one that guarantees its representativeness), the less certain it is that the sub-sample is really representative of the targeted sub-population. However, given the lack of baseline data on the target population, the most statistically robust method is to extract a sub-sample from an overall sample that offers every guarantee of being representative. This method was applied for the "Muslim" sample and for the "control group" (non-Muslim).

Data collection

The survey was conducted among a total sample of 927 individuals: a target sample representing Muslims in France and a control group representing the entire population residing in metropolitan France, aged 15 and over, and of French or foreign nationality.[31] These two samples are drawn from an overall sample of 8,300 people selected using quota sampling based on socio-demographic (gender and age), socio-professional (occupation), geographical (administrative region, size of urban unit, proportion of immigrants in the municipality or neighbourhood (IRIS level) of residence), and civic (nationality) criteria.[32]

---

[31] The data were provided by IFOP, which administered the survey. The survey does not include people residing in the French Overseas Territories—3.2% of the French population (2.1 million as of 01.01.14)—or French people living abroad (1.6 million as of 31.12.2012). The scope of the study is limited to people living in an ordinary household, i.e. who share the same primary residence with or without family ties. As with previous studies conducted among Muslims (e.g., the TeO survey in 2008-2009 and the IFOP-Institut Montaigne survey in 2016), the survey therefore excludes: the population living in communal establishments (worker's homes, student residences, retirement homes, nursing homes, religious communities and shelters); the population living in institutions without a personal residence (boarding schools, barracks, prisons); the population living in mobile dwellings (e.g., mobile home on land or sea, homeless).

[32] IRIS (*Ilots Regroupés pour l'Information Statistique*) is an INSEE statistical category, which divides the country into aggregated sub-municipal units of roughly equal size for statistical purposes. For more information, see https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/definition/c1523. As well as French nationals, the survey also includes foreigners

These quotas were defined on the basis of INSEE census data for the population aged 15 and over residing in mainland France. Responses to the questionnaires were collected by landline or mobile phone between 5 February and 3 March 2018.

The "Muslim" sample consists of 426 people (5.1% of the overall sample) who declare themselves to be Muslim. In concrete terms, after a series of questions on the respondent's age, sex and occupation, the interviewer says: "The following questions are about religion. You can reply that you don't know or decline to answer. In terms of religion, would you say you are...?" followed by seven choices: "Catholic; Protestant; Muslim; Orthodox; Jewish; other religion; no religion", added to which are the possibilities "decline to answer" or "don't know".[33] The "Muslim" sample is composed of the people who answered "Muslim" to this filter question.

This methodological choice results in both Muslims from Muslim families and "converted" Muslims (from a Catholic family, for example) being included. However, it excludes what is sometimes considered to be a cultural criterion, i.e., people who report having at least one Muslim parent (father, mother) regardless of their current sense of religious affiliation. We deliberately chose not to include this category in the Muslim sample.

The control sample consists of 501 non-Muslim people whose parents are not Muslim—i.e., with no personal or parental ties to Islam—and who are otherwise representative of the French population as a whole.

Methods of analysis

Several statistical methods were used to analyse the data. The variables were mainly described using frequency tables. The relationships between two variables were analysed using cross tabulation and averages tables. An explanatory model is developed in Chapter V to test the respective influence of a series of explanatory factors on the phenomenon under study.

Various statistical modelling techniques are used throughout the report. The choice of linear regression models or binomial logistic regression models depends on the type of variable to be explained (quantitative or dichotomous). Statistical modelling makes it possible to use causal reasoning to explain a phenomenon. These statistical techniques allow us to estimate the specific effects (sometimes called pure or net effects) of each of the explanatory variables introduced into the model, which neutralises the effect of the other explanatory variables on the variable to be explained.

---

living in metropolitan France, i.e., about 6% of the total population living in France (according to INSEE data from the 2012 census).

[33] For details, see the questionnaire in the appendix.

However, the analyses have certain limitations, particularly due to the sample size. A population of about 500 makes it more difficult to establish statistically significant relationships and precludes detailed analyses when the groups are small. These limitations should be taken into account when reading the statistical data in this study.

I. MUSLIMS IN FRANCE

KEY POINTS

- This study is based on a sample of 927 interviews: 426 with people who identify as "Muslim" and 501 with people who have no connection with Islam.
- The Muslim sample differs from the control group in terms of age distribution (the Muslim respondents are younger overall), professional situation (more non-working people such as students, fewer retirees, more lower-level employees and workers in routine occupations), religious practice (more frequent) and political position (more to the left).
- Overall, the Muslim sample trusts French state and social institutions (the army, social security, school, council, justice system, etc.) as much as, or slightly more than, the control group. Muslim respondents place politics and the media at the bottom of the trust scale, as does the control group. There are two institutions that Muslims trust less than the control group does: law enforcement and the media.
- Muslims feel discriminated against in all areas covered by this study (health, school, housing, policing, employment, daily life), and to a much greater degree than non-Muslims: 2.2 times more when looking for housing; 3.2 times more at school; 5.3 times more in interactions with the police.

The first part of our survey consists of a set of questions designed to identify the characteristics of respondents who consider themselves "Muslims" and to compare them with a control group of people who do not self-identify as Muslim. We focus on three main aspects.

First, we sought to find out some basic information about Muslims in France by asking respondents about their age, occupation, and relationship to religion and politics. This gives us a better socio-demographic picture of the main object of our study.

Second, we asked the respondents general questions to do with how they feel about the main French state and social institutions. As our study focuses on the relationship between a public policy (counter-terrorism) and feelings of discrimination, we felt it essential to measure respondents' general level of trust in the institutions involved in counter-terrorism.

Finally, since our investigation focuses on discrimination, we wanted to be able to place the potentially discriminatory effects of counter-terrorism in France in the more general context of discriminations faced by Muslim populations. This step seemed crucial to us in order to, again, compare the various possible sources of discrimination and Islamophobia.

Characteristics of the Muslim population

Distribution by age

This study is based on a combined sample (Muslim group and control group) of 927 respondents. Overall, the 25-44 age group constitutes the largest share of respondents for both Muslims (48.7%) and the control group (34.7%). There is, however, a significant difference between samples for the over-65 age group, which accounts for only 3.5% of the Muslim sample, compared to 23% of respondents in the control group. This means the control group sample is more balanced in terms of age, while much of the Muslim sample is made up of respondents aged between 35 and 49 (31.91%, compared to 25.7% for the control group).



Table 1. Distribution by age

Distribution by gender

Men and women are fairly evenly represented in the sample for both categories, with 46.5% men and 53.5% women in the Muslim group, and 49.5% men and 50.5% women in the control group.

	Muslim group	Control group
Men	46.5%	49.5%
Women	53.5%	50.5%

Table 2. Distribution by sex

Distribution by occupation[34]

With regard to occupation, the structure of the Muslim sample is fairly similar to that of the control group. The number of business owners, directors, and independent professionals is roughly similar (4.9% and 4.6%). The Muslim group comprises fewer higher managerial and intellectual professionals (4.7% compared to 9.4%), no farmers (compared to 0.8% in the control group) and slightly fewer people in intermediate occupations (10.3% compared to 15.2%). On the other hand, there are more lower-level employees (25.1% compared to 15%) and workers in routine occupations (14.6% compared to 10.8%). Two categories are radically different: the number of retirees (4.7% compared to 29.3%) and of "others not in work" (35% compared to 15%).

[34] The socio-professional categories used in the survey are based on the eight "*professions et catégories socioprofessionnelles*" established by INSEE in 1982: *Agriculteurs exploitants* (farmers); *Artisans, commerçants et chefs d'entreprise* (business owners, directors and independent professionals, including craftspeople and shopkeepers); *cadres supérieurs et professions libérales* (higher managerial and intellectual professionals), *professions intermédiaires* (intermediate occupations including school teachers, mid-level health workers, mid-level civil servants, mid-level clerical, sales and service employees, technicians and line supervisors), *employés* (lower-level clerical, sales and service employees, police and military personnel), *ouvriers* (workers in routine occupations including skilled and unskilled manual workers, drivers and farm workers), *retraités* (retirees), and *autres personnes sans activité professionnelle* (others not in work).



Figure 1. Distribution by occupation: Muslim sample



Figure 2. Distribution by occupation: control group

	Muslim group	Control group
Business owners, directors and independent professionals	4,90%	4,60%
Higher managerial and intellectual professions	4,70%	9,40%
Farmers	0%	0,80%
Intermediate occupations	10,30%	15,20%
Lower-level employees	25,10%	15%
Workers (routine occupations)	14,60%	10,80%
Retired	4,70%	29,30%
Others not in work	35,70%	15%

Table 3. Distribution by occupation

Political position

When asked about their political position, Muslim respondents are generally situated more to the left of the political spectrum than the control group.[35] More of the Muslim sample reports voting for France Insoumise, the Socialist Party and EELV (the Greens). Conversely, Muslim respondents support La République en Marche and Modem less, and Les Républicains substantially less. At the same time, disaffection with politics is widespread: the share of people who do not feel close to any party is high for the control group (31.3%) and significantly higher among Muslims (42%).

[35] Brouard and Tiberj found the same result in 2005: S. Brouard & V. Tiberj Vincent (2005), *op.cit.*, 46.



Figure 3. Political position

Religiosity

As part of a survey of the Muslim population, we thought it pertinent to measure the respondents' degree of religiosity so that this variable could be used as one of the possible explanatory factors of discrimination and differential attitudes towards institutions (as the survey shows, it proved to have no effect).

As we explained in the introduction, we decided to establish the category of "Muslims" based on self-identification. While it is reasonable to expect that the religiosity score of a category constituted on the basis of a religious criterion will be high, we nevertheless wanted to take cultural or family identification with Islam into account. Analysis of the data on religious belief reveals several points of interest.

Question: "Regardless of your religious affiliation, how strong would you say your religious belief is on a scale of 0 to 10?"	
Muslim group	Control group
8.4	3.9

Table 4. Religious belief score (average)

As expected, the Muslim sample has a much higher average score for religiosity (8.4 out of 10) than the control group (3.9 out of 10). Similarly, the proportion of Muslims who say they pray every day is much higher than for other religions (54.4% compared to just 5% for other religions). Nonetheless, 12.2% of Muslims say they never practice their religion, and 10.8% say they practice it only on holidays or less often. If we add these two figures, we can conclude that about a quarter (23%) of the Muslim sample identifies with Islam without observing any regular religious practice. For these respondents, Islam is therefore a cultural and identity signifier rather than a religious one.[36]

[36] Here, our findings lead us to diverge from the starting point of Brouard and Tiberj's study. Their methodological choice is to define Muslims exclusively in religious terms: "Our definition of the term Muslim is strictly religious. In our approach, therefore, there are no 'sociological Muslims' (Nancy Venel (2004), *Musulmans et citoyens*, Paris, PUF) or French people 'of Muslim culture' who are not of Muslim faith (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005: 18)." While Brouard and Tiberj's position is similar to ours (rejecting an "a priori" definition of the Muslim category), we acknowledge that self-identification with Islam does not necessarily involve any cultural practice.



Figure 4. Frequency of religious practice[37]

	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Jewish	Other
Every day	12.10%	35.70%	54.70%	25.00%	6.70%
More than once a week	8.60%	14.30%	5.20%	0.00%	0.00%
Once a week	9.50%	0.00%	4.00%	0.00%	0.00%
At least once a month	9.10%	7.10%	2.30%	0.00%	13.30%
Only at major holidays	19.40%	7.10%	7.00%	25.00%	0.00%
Less often	11.20%	7.10%	3.80%	0.00%	20.00%
Never	25.40%	28.60%	12.20%	50.00%	46.70%

Table 5. Frequency of religious practice

[37] For this question, the limits of a sample of 501 people are clear, since only four people declared themselves to be Jewish (compared to 260 Catholics, 18 Protestants and seven other religions).

Life satisfaction

Finally, the entire sample was asked a very general question about their degree of life satisfaction. Table 6 shows that the level of satisfaction is an almost identical whether the person identifies as Muslim or not; it is even slightly higher for the Muslim group.

Question: "Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life at the moment?"[38] (Score from 0 to 10)	
Muslim group	Control group
7.2	6.9

Table 6. Life satisfaction score

Trust in institutions

The first series of questions directly related to the topics of the survey concerns trust in institutions. We asked respondents to rate, on a scale of 0 to 10, their level of trust in the police and gendarmerie, schools, intelligence services, Parliament, the council, army, government, social security, media and justice system.

The first point to note is that, overall, Muslims express as much (or even slightly more) trust in institutions as the control group. There are only two exceptions: law enforcement agencies (police and gendarmerie) and the media.

[38] For assigning a score, the exact question was: "Please indicate your level of satisfaction on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 meaning that you are not at all satisfied and 10 that you are completely satisfied".

Question: "A2. Please indicate your level of trust in the following institutions on a scale of 0 to 10:"[39]



Figure 5. Trust in institutions

As shown in figure 5, both samples rank institutions in the same order. Among the institutions that inspire the most trust are the symbols of the French republican model of integration: the army, social security, schools and local authorities (the council). Law

[39] The exact wording is: "police and gendarmerie", "school", "intelligence services", "Parliament (National Assembly and Senate)", "the army", "your council", "the French president and government", "social security", "mainstream media (*Le Monde*, *France 2*, etc.)" and "the justice system".

enforcement institutions (police, intelligence services and the justice system) come next. Finally, the political and media sphere (government, parliament and the media) rate below average.

Two trends in the data are of particular interest here. First, the two institutions with the lowest overall score are the media and Parliament. Parliament's score reflects distrust of political parties—a finding consistent with the general feeling of detachment from politics revealed in the question on political affiliation. The media is notorious for being one of the main contributors to Islamophobic and discriminatory stereotypes, and our survey confirms the prevalence of this opinion.[40] It is no surprise, then, to find them at the bottom of the scale. Moreover, the media and the police are the only two institutions to have a lower trust score for the Muslim sample that the control sample. Given Muslims' high level of trust in institutions in general, we should consider this score significant. Although there is a large amount of qualitative and quantitative research on the relationship between stigmatised minorities and the police, our survey will explore the nature of this distrust in more detail.

	Average	N	Standard deviation
Control group	6.9	497	2.1
Muslim groups	6.5	415	2.8
Total	6.7	912	2.5

Table 7. Score for trust in the police and gendarmerie

Discrimination

Since the purpose of our survey was to understand the effect of counter-terrorism on discrimination, it was essential, to avoid influencing respondents' answers, to begin by asking them if they felt discriminated against in general. The survey aimed to assess the feeling of discrimination with regard to several everyday situations of life in France. Thus, Muslims and non-Muslims were asked whether they had felt discriminated against over the last five years when looking for a job, on the street or on public transport, when buying or renting housing, during a doctor's visit or hospital stay, in their dealings with teachers or administrative staff at school, and finally when being stopped and questioned by police.

A widespread feeling of discrimination

The difference between the two groups' personal experience of discrimination is striking. The figures diverge most remarkably in the cases of renting or buying housing and police

[40] T. Deltombe, L'islam imaginaire, *op.cit.*; Vincent Geisser (2003), *La Nouvelle Islamophobie*, Sur le vif, Paris, La Découverte.

stops: about 24.2% of Muslims have felt discriminated against in the first case, compared to only 7.2% of people in the control group, and 25.7% of Muslims in the second case compared to 4.8% of the control group. Even during doctors' visits or hospital stays, for which the rates are low, the feeling of discrimination is 4.5 higher among Muslims than in the control group.



Figure 6. Feeling of discrimination

One in four Muslims report having faced discrimination in the last five years at work or when looking for a job, on the street or in public transport, when dealing with the police, or when looking for housing.

[41] The question was preceded by the following introduction: "Now we would like to ask about several areas of life where you may have experienced discrimination. By discrimination we mean any form of treatment that has favoured or disadvantaged you on the grounds of one or more personal characteristics or choices—whether real or perceived—such as your origin, nationality, ethnicity or religion". The exact wording of the responses was: "at work or when looking for a job", "in the street or on public transport", "when looking to buy or rent a flat or house", "when visiting a doctor or hospital", "when interacting with teachers or staff at school", "when stopped by police in the street, when driving, in public transport or on a trip".

This feeling is equally prominent among men and women, with two exceptions. Muslim men feel much more discriminated against (31.4%) than Muslim women (20.5%) with regard to being stopped by police, while a higher proportion of Muslim women feel discriminated against (28.9%) on the streets and in public transport than Muslim men (24.8%). Moreover, the same pattern can be observed in the control group for this everyday situation, where 15% of women report being exposed to discrimination compared to 7.3% of men. There is also a relatively high percentage of women in the control group who have felt discriminated against in hiring situations or at work. Muslim women feel slightly less discriminated against than Muslim men in these situations but feel much more discriminated against than the women in the control group.[42]

Apart from those over 65 years of age, this feeling of discrimination does not decrease particularly with age overall, and still less among the Muslim group. The example of police stops is particularly instructive here, since under the age of 65, between 22.7% and 28.8% of respondents report having had at least one experience that seemed discriminatory to them over the past five years.

It therefore appears that overall, people who identify as Muslim feel more discriminated against in their daily lives than the control group. This feeling transcends both age and sex categories, which suggests that these variables do not necessarily act as discriminating factors. The extent of the discrimination reported here belies the idea that young Muslim men are the only ones who feel stigmatised. Indeed, the category of people who self-identify as Muslim feel two, three, or even four times more discriminated against than the control group depending on the situation. And when it comes to the reasons put forward for the perceived discrimination, the divisions between the two groups are clear.

Perceived reasons for discrimination

Out of the total sample of 927 people, 381 have felt discriminated against at least once in the last five years, representing nearly 41.3% of our sample. Several reasons were given across the two groups, which can be grouped into six main categories: age, gender, sexual orientation, origin or skin colour, religion, and others.[43] Overall, the main reason put forward for the discrimination was origin and skin colour (48.3%), followed by religion (14.5%).[44]

---

[42] These findings are consistent with those of a study by the French ombudsman (*défenseur des droits*) on discrimination at work. See Défenseur des droits (2018), *11e baromètre de la perception des discriminations dans l'emploi*, Paris, 27 September 2018 : https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etudresult-harcmoral-a4-num-30.08.18.pdf (consulted on 28 September 2018).

[43] The questionnaire did not specify which origin—ethnic, national or social, for instance. In French, however, the term "origine" usually denotes ethnic or national origin.

[44] These findings are consistent with the T&O survey (Beauchemin et al. (2010), *op.cit.* p. 131 and the EU-MIDIS II survey, European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2018) *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey*. Luxembourg, Publication Office. http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2015/eu-midis-ii-second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey.

However, when we look separately at the responses of the "Muslim" and "control group" categories, we see that these first figures are essentially explained by the higher level of discrimination experienced by the Muslim group. While 26.9% of respondents in the control group felt discriminated against at least once in the last five years, this figure jumps to 58.1% for Muslims. More than 58.3% of this group saw their origin or skin colour as the main reason for the discrimination, compared to less than 23.9% of respondents in the control group. If we look at religion, there is an even greater distinction between the two groups: this reason is put forward by more than 23.5% of Muslim respondents, compared to just 1.5% of those in the control group. We can conclude that religion is not a major discriminatory factor for non-Muslims, whereas it is one of the main discriminatory factors for Muslims.

On the other hand, the feeling of discrimination is widespread even among "non-Muslims" (more than 31% of people in this sample had faced discrimination), but for different reasons. While respondents in the control group also frequently encountered discrimination based on their origin or skin colour (almost 24% of the reasons they gave), the main reasons for discrimination put forward here are gender (almost 24% of the reasons given) and age (almost 15%). The frequency of these responses is practically reversed among Muslims.

In other words, the type of discrimination that people identified or self-identified as Muslims experience marks them out strongly as a differentiated group.

Question (if "yes" to the previous question): "In your opinion, what was the main reason? Your…"

	Total		Muslim group		Control group	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Age	29	6.8 %	8	3.2 %	20	14.9 %
Gender	42	9.8 %	6	2.4 %	32	23.9 %
Sexual orientation	6	1.4 %		0 %	5	3.7 %
Origin or skin colour	207	48.3 %	144	58.3 %	32	23.9 %
Religion	62	14.5 %	58	23,5 %	2	1.5 %
Other	49	11.4 %	14	5.7 %	31	23.1 %
Don't know	27	6.3 %	15	6.1 %	10	7.5 %
Decline to answer	7	1.6 %	2	0.8 %	2	1.5 %
Total	381	100.0 %	247	100.0 %	134	100.0 %

Base: 381 people who have felt discriminated against in the last five years

Table 8. Reasons put forward for discrimination

Conclusion: the condition of Muslims in France

In addition to the socio-demographic characteristics described in the first part of this chapter, the survey responses leads to a paradoxical observation that may seem surprising at first glance.

On the one hand, it appears that Muslims in France generally have more trust in French state and social institutions than the control group. The trust scores given by the Muslim group—except for the police and media—are higher than those of the control group. On the other hand, the feeling of discrimination is much more common among Muslims than among the control group, for all the themes covered in the questionnaire (health, school, housing, police, employment, daily life). The difference between the scores is considerable: 2.2 times more common when looking for housing; 3.2 times more at school; 5.3 times more in dealings with the police. This observation opens several avenues of reflection for our research.

First, it means that Muslims in France should be seen as a population that places a high degree of trust in state institutions, the army, and above all, social security (welfare) most of all. They are therefore not, as a certain media discourse maintains, hostile to or distrustful of institutions.

Second, if we are to gauge the effect of counter-terrorism on discrimination, we must bear in mind that discrimination and Islamophobia are part of daily life for a considerable number of Muslims in France. It will therefore be difficult to isolate a potentially discriminatory effect of counter-terrorism, as it must be clearly distinguished from discrimination commonly experienced in contact with schools, social workers or law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, that is what this study will try to do.

II. INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE

KEY POINTS

- Overall, the Muslim group feels exposed to counter-terrorism (law enforcement) and counter-radicalisation (youth workers, social workers) measures as much as the control group.
- The Muslim sample even reports slightly less contact with the police and gendarmerie for counter-terrorism than the control sample. However, young Muslim men report being in contact with youth workers twice as much.
- Muslims and non-Muslims consider the contact with youth workers and social workers to be justified as a whole; however, police stops appear less justified to Muslims, who feel they are treated significantly worse than the control group does.
- Many Muslim respondents feel stigmatised by counter-terrorism: they say they are deliberately chosen in interactions with police and public officials related to counter-terrorism, most often because of their origin or skin colour (2.5 times more than the control group).

The second part of the questionnaire is similar to what is commonly called a victimisation survey—a data collection strategy traditionally used to measure respondents' experiences of crime. Introduced to France in the 1980s, victimisation surveys make it possible to obtain figures other than those recorded by the authorities (in particular by the police).[45] Since there are currently no figures in France on the experience individuals have of counter-terrorism activities (whether Muslim or non-Muslim), we saw this first step as a relevant means to record the feelings of Muslim populations towards counter-terrorism.

This part of the survey is divided into three parts, which correspond to three key questions. First, are Muslims more exposed to counter-terrorism activities than the control group? This question dominates the political discourse on counter-terrorism and its effects; advocacy groups have repeatedly criticised these policies' ostensible targeting of populations perceived as Muslim.

Second, does the questioning or contact instigated in connection with counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation seem justified to those who experience it? This touches on the key question of the legitimacy of counter-terrorism activities: do those who experience such questioning or contact consider it necessary and justified in the current climate?

[45] Renée Zauberman (2015), "Les enquêtes de victimation. Une brève histoire, quelques usages", *Idées économiques et sociales*, vol. 181 (3): 8-21.

Third, do the people exposed to counter-terrorism activities feel they are well treated, or do they believe they have been discriminated against? Here we are getting to the heart of the survey's objective: in interactions with the authorities and in the way people are selected for them, do respondents consider that government policy is fair and properly implemented?

Exposure to counter-terrorism

Overall, the Muslim sample's responses do not differ significantly from the control group's regarding how they feel about contact with the various institutions involved in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation in France. The only exception is in relations with the police; fewer people in the Muslim sample report having been stopped and questioned by the police than in the control group.

If we consider all the people who answered "yes" to the question, "In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been..." in contact with youth workers, social workers or police officers, the Muslim and control groups appear to feel exposed to a similar degree, if not less for the former: 23.9% for the Muslim sample and 29.8% for the control group. The various components of this figure, which is high for both groups (between a quarter and a third of French people say they have been in contact with professionals involved in counter-terrorism), should be analysed in detail.

Question: "In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been..."				
	Muslim group		Control group	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
"In contact with youth workers" and/or "with social workers"	13.2% 56	86.8% 368	12.4% 62	87.6% 438
"In contact with youth workers" and/or "with social workers" and/or "stopped and questioned by police, gendarmerie, customs officials, or other law enforcement officers"	23.9% 102	76.1% 324	29.8% 149	70.2% 351

Table 9. Contact with youth workers, social workers and law enforcement officers

Contact with youth workers

Counter-radicalisation, considered the "preventive" aspect of counter-terrorism, is implemented through a number of channels: community-based, religious, educational, etc. For our survey, we chose to focus on the activities of youth workers and social workers—two social work categories that have seen "counter-radicalisation" become one of their priorities since the first plans were put in place in 2014.

The rate of positive responses to the question, "In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been in contact with youth workers?" is similar for both samples: 5.6% for Muslims, 5.7% for the control group. The distribution by age shows a significant difference in the under 25 age group, with 8.6% for Muslims compared to 2.1% for the control group, i.e., four times more. Due to the small sample size, however, we cannot consider this variation to be representative, as it concerns only nine and one respondents respectively. Young Muslims are therefore over-represented in contact with youth workers. Meanwhile, nothing new can be inferred from the "gender" variable as the variations in neither group are significant.

Contact with social workers

The rate of positive responses to the question, "In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been in contact with social workers?" is higher—almost double—than for youth workers: 9.4% of Muslims and 10.6% of the control group answer "yes" to this question. The difference between the Muslim and control groups is negligible (1.2 points). Still, Muslim men report less contact with social workers than men in the control group (10.6% compared to 12.9%), while the percentage for women is similar (8.3%).

Contact with law enforcement

Turning to the question of encounters with law enforcement, the first point to note is that more respondents report instances of contact with the police, gendarmerie and custom officials than with youth workers and social workers across both samples, though the percentage is lower for the Muslim group (16.03%) than the control group (22.2%). Contrary to what might be expected, the number of young people in contact with law enforcement is no higher than for other age groups in either of the samples. On the other hand, contact with police, gendarmerie or customs officials is strongly gendered across both samples; among Muslims, it concerns 21.1% men and 11.4% women (1.8 times more); the control group shows a similar but slightly less pronounced difference, with 26.6% men and 17.8% women (1.5 times more). Police stops are therefore the most visible face of counter-terrorism. They affect more men than women, and more young and working-age people than over 65s.

Question: "In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been stopped and questioned by the police, gendarmerie or customs officials?"

	Muslim group			Control group		
	Yes	No	N/A	Yes	No	N/A
Total N	14.8% 63	84.5% 360	0.5% 3	22.2% 111	77.2% 387	0.6% 3
Age						
Under 25	14.3%	84.8%	1%	22.9%	77.1%	0%
25-44	15.7%	83.8%	0.5%	22.4%	76.4%	1.1%
45-64	14.6%	84.4%	1%	23.2%	76.8%	0%
65 +	6.7%	93.3%	0	20.0%	79.1%	1%
Sex						
Male	19.7%	79.3%	1%	26.6%	72.6%	0.8%
Female	10.5%	89%	0,4%	17.8%	81.8%	0.4%

Table 10. Stops by law enforcement officers

Perceived level of justification for contact or stops

After asking respondents if they had been in contact with the various services involved in counter-terrorism, we asked them if they felt that these interactions were justified.

Level of justification for contact with counter-radicalisation activities

Concerning contact with youth workers and social workers—i.e., professionals involved in counter-radicalisation work—the Muslim group and the control group respond in a very similar way. On a scale of 0 to 10 (0 being "totally unjustified" and 10 being "totally justified"), Muslim respondents gave an average score of 7.3; the control group's average score is slightly higher at 7.8 (for social workers).

Question: "Thinking back, can you indicate how justified you think the contact or stop was on a scale of 0 to 10?"	
Contact with social workers	
Muslim group	Control group
7.3	7.8
Contact with youth workers	
Muslim group	Control group
6.6	7.2

Table 11. Level of justification for contact with youth workers and social workers

Level of justification for contact with law enforcement

When it comes to police stops, however, a different picture emerges. Here, Muslim respondents record a justification score of 5.6/10 on average (a score of less than 5 indicating that the stops do not seem justified) compared to 7.7 for the control group.

Question: "Can you indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 whether you think the contact or stop was justified?" Question asked after respondents answered "yes" to having been "stopped and questioned by police, gendarmerie, custom officials, or other law enforcement officers" in the previous question.

Muslim group	Control group
5.6	7.7

Table 12. Level of justification for stops by law enforcement

Looking more closely at the pattern of responses, we see that the distribution of responses varies significantly. 2.7 times more Muslims than members of the control group consider the police stops totally unjustified (12.3% of Muslims and 4.5% of the control group chose the zero score). Conversely, Muslim respondents choose the "totally justified" answer 1.7 times less than the control group (19.8% compared to 35.1%).



Figure 7. Level of justification for stops by law enforcement

Selection and treatment during interactions

Treatment

The finding is similar when we look at how people feel they were treated. To the question, "Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, how do you think you were treated? (0 = very badly, 10 = very well)", Muslims give an average score of 6.9 out of 10, while the control group gives an average score of 8.5. Muslims clearly feel less well treated than members of the control group (the differential is around 20%).

Question: "In general, on a scale of 0 to 10, how do you think you were treated?[46]	
Muslim group	Control group
6.9	8.5

Table 13. Treatment during interactions

Again, a detailed analysis of the responses shows that their distribution differs between the groups. There is a larger group of Muslim respondents who are clearly dissatisfied with the treatment they received, with 5.6% considering they were "very badly" treated (score of 0) compared to 1.3% of the control group (i.e., 4.3 times less). Similarly, a smaller number of Muslim respondents report being treated very well (28.2% of Muslims give a score of 10, compared to 38.9% of the control group).



Figure 8. Treatment during interactions

Selection

When respondents are asked, "How do you think you were selected for these interactions?", the feeling of being deliberately singled out is much stronger among Muslims than among the control group. 37.1% of Muslims think they were chosen deliberately, compared to 20.8% of the control group (almost twice as many). Similarly, only 43.5% of Muslim respondents compared to 66.4% of respondents from the control group believe they were randomly selected.

Question: "How do you think you were selected for these interactions?"		
Overall	Muslim group	Control group

[46] The question was followed by the following clarification: "0 meaning that you were very badly treated, 10 that you were very well treated".

	N	%	N	%	N	%
Overall	273	100%	124	100 %	149	100%
Randomly	153	56.0%	54	43.5%	99	66.4%
Deliberately	77	28.2%	46	37.1%	31	20.8%
Don't know	38	13.9%	22	17.7%	16	10.7%
Decline to answer	5	1.8%	2	1.6%	3	2.0%
Base: 273 people in contact with the authorities						

Table 14. Perception of the selection method

We asked respondents who felt that they had been deliberately singled out a supplementary question to find out what they thought were the grounds for their selection (they could choose several reasons). Again, there is a significant difference between the two groups. Among Muslims, 37% consider that they were singled out because of their origin (compared to 9.7% in the control group), 34.8% because of the colour of their skin (compared to 3.2%), and 15.2% because of their religion (compared to 3.2% of respondents in the control group). Of the proposed responses, only clothing was chosen by a larger share of the control group than of the Muslim group (16.1% compared to 15.2%). It should also be noted that in the control group, 45.2% of respondents chose to give another reason and 25% declined to answer.

Question: "On what basis do you think you were chosen?" Because of...						
	Overall		Muslim group		Control group	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Total	77	100%	46	100%	31	100%
Your origin	20	26.0%	17	37.0%	3	9.7%
Your skin colour	17	22.1%	16	34.8%	1	3.2%
Your religion	8	10.4%	7	15.2%	1	3.2%
Your clothing	12	15.6%	7	15.2%	5	16.1%
Your age	14	18.2%	10	21.7%	4	12.9%
Your gender	7	9.1%	7	15.2%		-
Your sexual orientation	1	1.3%		-	1	3.2%
Other: please specify	18	23.4%	4	8.7%	14	45.2%
Don't know	11	14.3%	3	6.5%	8	25.8%
Decline to answer	1	1.3%	1	2.2%		-
Base: 77 people who feel they were deliberately chosen						

Table 15. Basis for selection

Conclusion: individual experience

After analysis of the responses concerning exposure to counter-terrorism, several of our findings confirm those of previous qualitative studies. Yet they also invalidate a number of preconceived ideas about how Muslim populations in France perceive counter-terrorism.

The first point is that law enforcement's role in counter-terrorism is by far the most visible, and therefore the most representative. Given the state of emergency, the increased police presence and daily police stops on public transport, in train stations, airports, and even on the street, this is not surprising. Counter-radicalisation, addressed in our questionnaire through the work of youth workers and social workers, is less pervasive. However, given that there are other professionals involved in implementing counter-radicalisation who were not mentioned in our survey, more data is needed to obtain a comprehensive overview of the population's exposure to these policies.

It is fairly clear that individuals in the Muslim population as a whole do not feel more exposed to counter-terrorism than the control group, whether through contact with youth workers, social workers or the police. There are some differences when we look at the situation in more detail: young Muslims are over-represented in the contact with youth workers (4 times more) and social workers; Muslim men report less contact than men in the control group. The main difference between the samples concerns relations with the police, but not in the sense that one might expect: fewer Muslims report having been in contact with the police than respondents in the control group. This point requires further investigation to understand precisely why the figure is lower for Muslims.

If we look at the way Muslims view their interactions with the French counter-terrorist apparatus, the feeling of unease is clear. While Muslims' relations with youth workers and social workers involved in counter-radicalisation are fairly good and no different from the control group's, our survey confirms the findings of previous surveys that highlight the poor relationship between law enforcement and populations of immigrant background—which represent the majority of the survey's "Muslim" sub-sample. Muslims feel they are targeted because of their origin or skin colour (2.5 times more than the control group). They also feel considerably less well treated than the control group.

III. COLLECTIVE PERCEPTIONS

KEY POINTS

- Muslims and non-Muslims reply similarly when asked whether counter-terrorism policies provide them with a sense of security. Both groups find the policies moderately effective (average score of 5.9 on a scale of 0 to 10).
- Responses vary according to age, however: young Muslims feel less safe than non-Muslims their age, whereas Muslims aged 45-64 feel safer than non-Muslims in the same age group.
- Muslims and non-Muslims consider overall that counter-terrorism has little impact on their privacy. This feeling is more prevalent among young people.
- Two-thirds of Muslim respondents and three-quarters of the control group believe that counter-terrorism predominantly targets certain groups. Half of the respondents consider that the choice of target depends on religion.
- More Muslim respondents (over twice as many) find this targeting totally unjustified or insufficiently justified than control group respondents (34.4% compared to 15.1%). Conversely, fewer Muslims find this targeting fairly well or totally justified (31.9% compared to 43.5%).

The previous chapter focused on Muslims' individual experiences of counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism activities. In this part of the survey, we asked respondents about their perceptions of counter-terrorism's effectiveness and potentially discriminatory effects. The purpose here therefore is not to examine direct experiences of interaction with the state, but to understand how Muslims perceive the way they are treated collectively.

We asked three main questions. First, do the respondents perceive counter-terrorism in France as effective? Do they feel reassured? This information will help understand whether these policies are seen as effective in meeting their objective: to reassure the population by preventing potential terrorist attacks.

The second question concerns these policies' potential encroachment on privacy: do Muslims feel, more than the control group, that counter-terrorism policies threaten their civil liberties? We thought this question particularly relevant in view of the severe restriction of civil liberties resulting from successive counter-terrorism laws, particularly under the state of emergency (see introduction).

Third, beyond their personal experience, do respondents have the impression that counter-terrorism targets a particular group or groups, and if so, which group(s)? The purpose of this question is to find out for both the control group and the Muslim group whether, if they

look beyond their own experience, respondents feel that counter-terrorism stigmatises particular communities.

Sense of security

Counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism policies are not only designed to prevent terrorist attacks. They also aim to reassure the population. What is the impact of public policy in this area? Do the French feel reassured? Is the effectiveness of these policies perceived differently among Muslims? To find out, we asked respondents the following question: "Over the past five years, the authorities have taken action to deal with terrorism. Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 how much these measures have contributed to your sense of security". As Table 16 shows, the response is fairly similar for the two groups: the average "sense of security" score is 5.8 for the Muslim group and 6.0 for the control group. Overall, then, French people feel moderately reassured and Muslims share this feeling.

Question: "Over the past five years, the authorities have taken action to deal with terrorism. Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 how much these measures have contributed to your sense of security"[47]		
	Muslim group	Control group
TOTAL	5.8	6
By age group		
<25	5.7	6.4
25-44	5.3	5.4
45-64	7	6.2
65+	5.7	6.6
By sex		
Male	6	5.8
Female	5.7	6.3

Table 16. Sense of security

Looking at the responses in more detail, however, we see that the sense of security score is distributed differently. 2.6 times more respondents in the Muslim group report not feeling safe "at all" (9.9% chose "0" compared to 3.8% than the control group); and all scores from 5 to 9 were chosen more often by the control group (only 10, "completely safe", was chosen more by Muslims). If we look at the average scores by age and by sex, we find a larger difference between the two groups for respondents under 25 (score of 5.7 for Muslims, compared to 6.4 for the control group). This trend reverses with age, however, with Muslims aged between 45 and 64 giving an average score of 7 compared to 6.2 for the control group.

[47] The question was followed by a clarification: "0 meaning that these measures have not made you feel safe at all, and 10 that they have made you feel completely safe".

The variation is particularly significant among women: Muslim women feel less secure (5.7) than other women living in France (6.3). In short, young Muslims feel less safe than average, while Muslims aged 45 to 64 feel safer than average.



Figure 9. Sense of security

Respect for privacy

Turning to respondents' feelings about how counter-terrorism measures affect their privacy, we observe that again, the difference between the Muslim group and the control group is slight. Both groups consider that the impact on their privacy is relatively low: 3 points for Muslims compared to 2.4 for the control group. If we group the responses into three more or less equivalent levels (little or no impact, from 0 to 3; moderate impact, from 4 to 7; and major impact, from 8 to 10), the distribution is relatively similar: 53.1% of Muslims and 65.7% of the control group report little or no impact; 31.6% of Muslims and 21.8% of the control group report a moderate impact, and only 8.2% of Muslims and 4.8% of the control group report a major impact. Finally, one figure is particularly worth noting: 38.8% of the Muslim group and 43.7% of the control group say they are not affected at all (score of 0).

Question: "Again on a scale of 0 to 10, please indicate to what extent the measures the authorities have taken in relation to terrorism and counter-radicalisation have encroached on your privacy."[48]		
	Muslim group	Control group
Score (average)	3	2,4
Distribution of responses		
0-4 (little or no impact)	59.1%	70.1%
5-10 (moderate to major impact)	34.5%	26.6%
Score by age (0 to 10)		
Under 25	2.3	2
25-44	3.1	2.6
45-64	3.5	2.1
65 +	3.3	2.6
Score by gender (0 to 10)		
Male	3.2	2.5
Female	2.8	2.2

Table 17. Impact on privacy

Looking at the distribution of responses by age group, it appears that the group most targeted by counter-terrorism policies (young Muslims, usually men) feels slightly less affected than other Muslims (a score of 2.3 for those under 25, compared to scores ranging from 3.1 to 3.5 for the rest of the Muslim group). Young Muslims feel slightly more affected than young respondents in the control group—2.3 compared to 2. But under-25s in the control group also give a lower score than the other age groups in the sample (2 compared to scores ranging from 2.1 to 2.6 for the other age groups). A similar pattern is apparent (in the same proportions) when considering the sex variable, where in both the Muslim group (men = 3.2 and women = 2.7) and the control group (men = 2.5 and women = 2.2), men feel more than women that counter-terrorism has a negative impact on their privacy.

[48] The question was followed by a clarification: "0 meaning that these measures have had no impact on your privacy, and 10 meaning that they have seriously encroached on your privacy".



Figure 10. Impact on privacy

Targeting of certain groups

The third question concerns respondents' general impression of counter-terrorism, particularly its potentially discriminatory effects. When asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement, "the measures the authorities have taken in relation to terrorism and counter-radicalisation over the last five years have targeted certain groups or communities", the responses show a near consensus between the two groups, with again a lower rate of positive responses among Muslims. 68.4% of Muslims say they agree with this statement (compared to 71.1% of the control group). Conversely, 20.6% of Muslims disagree with the statement, compared to 19.6% of the control group.

Question: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding the measures the authorities have taken in relation to terrorism and counter-radicalisation over the past five years?" Statement: "These measures have targeted certain groups or communities"

	Overall		Muslim group		Control group	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
	927	100%	426	100%	501	100%
Totally agree	252	27.2%	134	31.5%	118	23.6%
Mostly agree	382	41.2%	143	33.6%	239	47.7%
Total in agreement	634	68.4%	278	65.1%	357	71.1%
Mostly disagree	85	9.2%	38	8.9%	47	9.4%
Totally disagree	106	11.4%	55	12.9%	51	10.2%
Total in disagreement	191	20.6%	94	21.8%	98	19.6%
Don't know	87	9.4%	46	10.8%	41	8.2%
Decline to answer	15	1.6%	10	2.3%	5	1.0%

Table 18. Perception of targeting

We then asked respondents who they thought counter-terrorism measures targeted (several responses were possible). As Table 9 shows, the differences between the two groups are minor. About a third of respondents believe that people of a "certain origin" are targeted (37.1% Muslim group, 35.2% control group); about half believe that a specific religion is targeted (55.3% Muslim group, 45.6% control group); and about a quarter of respondents also think that certain neighbourhoods are specifically targeted (27.8% Muslim group, 24.7% control group). Only for one response is there a clear difference between the two groups: "none of the above", with 18.1% of respondents in the control group choosing this response compared to almost half as many in the Muslim group (11.4%).

Question: "Over the past five years, do you think that the measures the authorities have taken to combat terrorism and radicalisation have targeted…?"

	Overall		Muslim group		Control group	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
People of a specific origin	255	36.1%	127	37.1%	128	35.2%
People from a specific religious group	355	50.3%	189	55.3%	166	45.6%
People from specific neighbourhoods	185	26.2%	95	27.8%	90	24.7%
Specific places, such as community centres or mosques	192	27.2%	104	30.4%	88	24.2%
None of the above	105	14.9%	39	11.4%	66	18.1%
Don't know	50	7.1%	21	6.1%	29	8.0%
Decline to answer	7	1.0%	1	0.3%	6	1.6%

Base: 706 who selected at least one positive response: 342 for the "Muslim" group; 364 for the control group

Table 19. Perception of targeted categories

Finally, we asked those who agreed or strongly agreed with the previous statement how justified they thought this targeting was on a scale of 1 to 10. Overall, the responses of the two samples diverge, with the Muslim group finding the targeting much less justified (average score of 4.8) than the control group (average score of 6.0). A detailed analysis also reveals a difference in the distribution of the responses: a higher proportion of Muslim respondents find this targeting unjustified (34.5% give a justification score ranging from 0 to 3) than control group respondents (15.4%). Conversely, if we consider the grouped scores of 4-6 and 7-10, indicating that respondents tend to agree or strongly agree with targeting, we see that Muslim scores are systematically lower (see Figure 11).

Question: "On a scale of 0 to 10, please indicate how justified this targeting seems to you".				
	Muslim group		Control group	
Scores (average)	4,8		6,0	
Score distribution				
	N	%	N	%
Scores of 0 to 3	94	34.5%	59	15.4%
Scores of 4 to 6	47	33.6%	47	41.2%
Scores of 7 to 10	91	31.9%	154	43.4%
n	232	100%	260	100%

Table 20. Justification of targeting



Figure 11. Justification of targeting

Conclusion: collective perceptions

Our analysis of how respondents perceive the effects of counter-terrorism policies shows a definite contrast between the Muslim population's perceptions and those of the control group.

If we look at the responses in this part of the survey as a whole, the positions of the Muslim group and the control group converge to a certain degree with regard to the effects of counter-terrorism on the sense of security, on privacy and, counter-intuitively, on the justification for targeting certain groups, particularly because of their religion. Yet a more detailed analysis of the data reveals differentiated positions within the Muslim group and the control group for some questions.

The first finding is that, overall, the population does not seem wholly convinced of counter-terrorism policies' capacity to prevent terrorism. Although not the main focus of the survey, this point will certainly be of interest to the stakeholders of counter-terrorism given that, in addition to the objective of preventing future terrorist attacks, one of its main political purposes is to reassure the public about their safety. The generational difference among Muslims in France on this point raises questions, since the under-25 group feels less reassured than the control group, while their elders inversely show a higher sense of security than the control group.

The second finding is that the majority of the population in both the Muslim and non-Muslim groups considers that counter-terrorism policies do not have much impact on their privacy. While this finding is certainly at variance with the discourse of some human rights organisations, it is not entirely surprising, since it has already been noted in other studies.

The third finding is that Muslims and non-Muslims agree overall that counter-terrorism policies target a specific category of the population. The category most often thought to be targeted is based on religion, followed by origins, then living in certain neighbourhoods. Evidently, neither Muslims nor the population as a whole believe the Republican discourse that French counter-terrorism policy is non-discriminatory. Even in the control group, only one in five people (18.1%) think that none of the categories mentioned are targeted. Similarly, a larger number of Muslim respondents (over twice as many) find this targeting mostly or totally unjustified compared to the control group (34.4% compared to 15.1%) and conversely, fewer Muslims find this targeting fairly or totally justified (31.9% compared to 43.5%).

IV. IMPACT ON BEHAVIOUR

KEY POINTS

- About one in three Muslims claim to "avoid saying what they think about controversial topics related to foreign policy" (30.6%) or society (30.5%). Yet, the control group's attitude is not very different (25.9% and 28.7% respectively). Self-censorship therefore appears across the board and is more pronounced among Muslims.
- 79.8% of Muslims and 84.4% of the control group say they have not changed their habits to protect their online privacy. This means, however, that the minority who say they are careful is twice as large among Muslims (9.2% compared to 5%).
- Counter-terrorism has very little impact on the most visible aspects of religion, such as clothing (traditional dress, hijab or headscarf). 86.7% of Muslims say they have not changed the way they dress. However, the percentage of Muslims who say they have changed the way they dress (8.5%) is five times higher than for the control group (1.6%).
- More than a third of Muslims (38.5%) say they no longer read or watch certain media outlets because of these outlets' approach to Islam. This is particularly true for young people (41.9%). The figure increases further (43.7%) when it comes to media coverage of terrorism issues.
- About a quarter of respondents (26.1%) say they are careful what they say to youth workers and social workers, for fear of being discriminated against. Fewer claim to be careful what they say to doctors and nurses (19.7%).
- In addition, 41.7% of Muslims aged 45-64 say they ask their children to "be careful what they say at school", to avoid discrimination.
- Counter-terrorism has a significant impact on Muslim charities: over one-third of Muslims (36.9%) say they "think twice before donating to a charity".

After asking respondents about their individual experiences of counter-terrorism and their collective perceptions of its effects, we posed a series of questions specifically related to behavioural change. We based this part of the questionnaire on the findings of qualitative surveys about the effects of counter-terrorism in Britain. The aim of this section is to gain a more detailed understanding of how these policies influence the daily lives of people who self-identify as Muslim compared to the group that does not identify as such.

Obviously, the methodological limits of this part of the questionnaire must be taken into account. Specifically, we can only measure changes in behaviour on the basis of the responses we are given. However, a number of studies have pointed out that when such a "self-reporting" method is used, discrimination is not necessarily "over-reported" compared

to other methods (experimental, testing, and situational discrimination). For instance, as Safi and Simon show, self-reported experience tends to "underestimate the experience of discrimination rather than overstate victimisation."[49] So, if the data we gather reflects a more significant change in behaviour among Muslim respondents than for the control group, the actual situation is probably more acute.

In this last part of the questionnaire, we asked the respondents three sets of questions. First, had they changed their behaviour for fear of being discriminated against or considered suspicious? One of the first arguments put forward in the literature on the impact of counter-terrorism is that it has a so-called "chilling effect", i.e., it discourages or suppresses free expression due to fear of repercussions. We therefore sought to measure this effect.

Second, following on from the question posed in the previous section about counter-terrorism's impact on privacy, we tried to find out whether online habits had changed, particularly following Edward Snowden's revelations on NSA surveillance, and after the adoption of the Counter-Terrorism Act stepped up surveillance of online behaviour.

As a third potential behavioural change, we sought to understand whether counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies have had an impact on relations between Muslims and health, social work and education professionals, particularly in terms of trust.

Finally, as previously investigated in several qualitative studies, we wanted to know if, the targeting and potential discrimination to which Muslim populations are exposed has an effect on their religious, voluntary-sector or political involvement—either encouraging increased engagement or, on the contrary, withdrawal into the private sphere or their own community.

Attitudinal changes related to potential discrimination

First, we tried to find out whether the expectation of discriminatory situations had led Muslims in France to change their attitudes.

Counter-terrorism and freedom of expression: a chilling effect?

Our first question in this section sought to discover whether Muslim populations feel less comfortable talking about sensitive topical issues. When asked, "To avoid potential discrimination, do you avoid saying what you think about foreign policy issues such as conflicts abroad (online or on social media, at work, or in other social contexts)?", the two groups respond very similarly, with a slightly lower percentage for Muslims: 61.5% of Muslim respondents and 67.1% for the control group said no. This means that a slightly higher percentage of Muslims (30.3%) answered "yes" than control group respondents (25.9%).

[49] Mirna Safi & Patrick Simon (2013), *op.cit.,* p. 265.

Question: "To avoid potential discrimination, do you avoid saying what you think about foreign policy issues such as conflicts abroad (online or on social media, at work, or in other social contexts)?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex - Muslim group							
Female	72	31.6%	139	61.0%	17	7.5%	228
Male	57	28.8%	123	62.1%	18	9.1%	198
Total	129	30.3%	262	61.5%	35	8.2%	426
Sex - Control group							
Female	74	29.2%	160	63.2%	19	7.5%	253
Male	56	22.6%	176	71.0%	16	6.5%	248
Total	130	25.9%	336	67.1%	35	7.0%	501
Age - Muslim group							
Under 25	28	26.7%	68	64,8%	9	8.6%	105
25-44	68	32.4%	123	58.6%	19	9.0%	210
45-64	31	32.3%	61	63.5%	4	4.2%	96
65 and above	2	13.3%	10	66.7%	3	20.0%	15
Total	129	30.3%	262	61.5%	35	8.2%	426
Age - Control group							
Under 25	8	16.7%	36	75.0%	4	8.3%	48
25-44	51	29.3%	112	64.4%	11	6.3%	174
45-64	51	31.1%	102	62.2%	11	6.7%	164
65 and above	20	17.4%	85	73.9%	10	8.7%	115
Total	130	25.9%	335	66.9%	36	7.2%	501

Table 21. Freedom of expression and foreign policy issues

A similar question related to "controversial social issues" gives a relatively similar result, with the majority of respondents answering "no" (60.6% of Muslims and 65.1% of the control group).

Question To avoid potential discrimination, do you avoid saying what you think about controversial social issues (online or on social media, at work, or in other social contexts)?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Muslim group							
Female	73	32.0%	136	59.6%	19	8.3%	228
Male	57	28.8%	122	61.6%	19	9.6%	198
Total	130	30.5%	258	60.6%	38	8.9%	426
Control group							
Female	80	31.6%	155	61.3%	18	7.1%	253
Male	64	25.8%	171	69.0%	13	5.2%	248
Total	144	28.7%	326	65.1%	31	6.2%	501
Muslim group							
Under 25	31	29.5%	60	57.1%	14	13.3%	105
25-44	68	32.4%	127	60.5%	15	7.1%	210
45-64	31	32.0%	59	60.8%	7	7.2%	97
65 and above	1	6.7%	12	80.0%	2	13.3%	15
Total	131	30.7%	258	60.4%	38	8.9%	427
Control group							
Under 25	13	27.1%	33	68.8%	2	4.2%	48
25-44	52	29.9%	112	64.4%	10	5.7%	174
45-64	54	32.9%	102	62.2%	8	4.9%	164
65 and above	25	21.7%	79	68.7%	11	9.6%	115
Total	144	28.7%	326	65.1%	31	6.2%	501

Table 22. Freedom of expression and social issues

An interesting difference emerges, however, if we consider the gender variable for these two questions. While women's responses are similar in the Muslim group and the control group, men in the control group generally feel less vulnerable to potential discrimination than men in the "Muslim" group. For example, when asked whether they avoid saying what they think about foreign policy, only 22% of men in the control group said yes, whereas non-Muslim women, and men and women who self-identify as Muslim, agreed in similar proportions (approx. 30%). The age variable seems to have no real influence on the variation in responses: for foreign policy issues, only young people seem less concerned than older generations—more so in the control group. Another point to note is that the over-65s, particularly in the Muslim group, seem particularly unconcerned about this issue.

Online behaviour

When asked, “Have you changed your internet habits (stopped using certain applications, changed email providers, or used encryption)?”, an even greater majority of respondents said no than for the previous question: 79.8% of Muslims and 84.4% of the control group. Admittedly, a significantly higher proportion of the Muslim group answered “yes” (9.2%) than in the control group (5%, i.e. slightly less than half), but this figure remains relatively low. We can therefore infer that only a minority of people are concerned by this issue. Despite the small number of respondents who answered yes, it is worth noting that Muslim men feel twice as concerned about internet surveillance as Muslim women (12.1% and 6.6% respectively), whereas there is no real distinction between male and female respondents in the control group.

Question: "To avoid potential discrimination, have you changed your internet habits (stopped using certain applications, changed email providers, or used encryption)?

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex - Muslim group							
Female	15	6.6%	188	82.5%	25	11.0%	228
Male	24	12.1%	152	76.8%	22	11.1%	198
Total	39	9.2%	340	79.8%	47	11.0%	426
Sex - Control group							
Female	11	4.3%	208	82.2%	34	13.4%	253
Male	14	5.6%	215	86.7%	19	7.7%	248
Total	25	5%	423	84.4%	53	10.6%	501
Age - Muslim group							
Under 25	9	8.6%	89	84.8%	7	6.7%	98
25-44	18	8.6%	173	82.4%	19	9%	191
45-64	10	10.4%	71	74.0%	15	15.6%	81
65 and above	2	13.3%	7	46.7%	6	40%	47
Total	39	10.3%	340	89.7%	47	11.0%	426
Age - Control group							
Under 25	2	4.2%	44	91.7%	2	4.2%	46
25-44	13	7.5%	155	89.1%	6	3.4%	168
45-64	5	3.0%	147	89.6%	12	7.3%	152
65 and above	5	4.3%	77	67%	33	28.7%	82
Total	25	5.6%	423	94.4%	53	10.6%	448

Table 23. Change in internet habits

Clothing habits

To examine another possible consequence of the fear of discrimination due to counter-terrorism policies, we asked respondents if they had changed anything about the way they dress. This question gives similar results to the previous one and highlights a different dynamic between a majority of the Muslim population for whom this is not the case (86.7% of Muslims answered "no", as did 97% of the control group), and a minority who answered "yes" (8.5%). Even if the proportion of Muslims who said they had changed their clothing

habits is five times higher than for the control group, where this is practically never the case (1.6%), it is important to stress that in absolute terms, the "yes" response concerns a limited number of Muslim respondents (37 people out of 486). Of these respondents, if we look at the difference between men and women, it appears that Muslim men (10.1%) are slightly more likely than Muslim women (7.5%) to change the way they dress.

Question: "To avoid potential discrimination, have you changed you changed the way you dress or your appearance?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	M	Total
Sex - Muslim group							
Female	17	7.5%	203	89%	8	3.5%	228
Male	20	10.1%	167	84.3%	11	5.6%	198
Total	37	8.7%	370	86.9%	19	4.5%	426
Sex - Control group							
Female	7	2.8%	241	95.3%	5	2.0%	0
Male	1	0.4%	245	98.8%	2	0.8%	0
Total	8	1.6%	486	97%	7	1.4%	501
Age - Muslim group							
Under 25	10	9.5%%	90	85.7%	5	4.8%	105
25-44	21	10%	181	86.2%	8	3.8%	210
45-64	4	4.2%	89	92.7%	3	3.1%	96
65 and above	2	13.3%	10	66.7%	3	20%	15
Total	37	8.7%	370	86.9%	19	4.5%	426
Age - Control group							
Under 25	2	4.2%	45	93.8%	1	2.1%	48
25-44	4	2.3%	168	96.6%	2	1.1%	174
45-64	2	1.2%	160	97.6%	2	1.1%	164
65 and above	0	0%	113	98.3%	2	1.7%	115
Total	8	1.6%	486	97.0%	7	1.4%	501

Table 24. Change in clothing habits

Relationship to the media

Qualitative studies highlight the central role that the media play in propagating negative stereotypes related to Islam. We therefore asked a series of questions about this issue. First, we asked the group of Muslim respondents the following question: "Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you think they misrepresent the Muslim community?" While a majority of respondents say they have not changed their habits (53.2%), more than a third of people who self-identify as Muslim (38.5%) say they have changed their habits. Concern over this issue appears to vary significantly with age; it is mainly young people under 25 years of age (41.9%) and people aged between 25 and 44 (42.9%), who report having changed their habits because of how Muslims are represented. There is also a difference between men and women, with women being more likely to change their media habits (41.2%) than men (35.4%).

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you think they misrepresent the Muslim community?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex – Muslim group							
Female	94	41.2%	115	50.4%	19	8.3%	228
Male	70	35.4%	112	56.6%	16	8.1%	198
Total	164	38.5%	227	53.3%	35	8.2%	426
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	44	41.9%	45	42.9%	16	15.2%	105
25-44	90	42.9%	110	52.4%	10	4.8%	210
45-64	27	28.1%	62	64.6%	7	7.3%	96
65 and above	3	20%	10	66.7%	2	13.3%	15
Total	164	38.5%	227	53.2%	35	8.2%	426

Table 25. Change in relationship to the media

When asked "Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you don't trust their information on terrorism and counter-terrorism?", the response is even more pronounced. Although 47.2% answered no, "yes" does not come very far behind with 43.7% the Muslim group giving this answer. In short, while nearly half of Muslims continue to trust the media, another similar proportion are largely dissatisfied with the media's coverage of issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. There is no significant variation by age for this question.

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you don't trust their information on terrorism and counter-terrorism?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	46	43.8%	45	42.9%	14	13.3%	105
25-44	97	46.2%	100	47.6%	13	6.2%	210
45-64	37	38.5%	49	51.0%	10	10.4%	96
65 and above	6	40.0%	7	46.7%	2	13.3%	15
Total	186	43.7%	201	47.2%	39	9.2%	426

Table 26. Trust in the media

Relations with health, social work and education professionals

The following questions were specifically addressed to the Muslim group. We wanted to know whether they had changed their behaviour towards a range of professionals who are involved more and more in the prevention of radicalisation and are therefore increasingly part of the counter-terrorist apparatus.

The first question concerns doctors and nurses who, in principle, are not yet actively involved in counter-radicalisation measures, as they are other European countries such as the UK. Yet when asked, "Are you more careful what you say to doctors and nurses?" almost a fifth of Muslim respondents answer in the affirmative (19.7%), compared to 74.9% negative responses.

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Are you more careful what you say to doctors and nurses?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex – Muslim group							
Female	40	17.5%	178	78.1%	10	4.4%	228
Male	44	22.2%	141	71.2%	13	6.6%	198
Total	84	19.7%	319	74.9%	23	5.4%	426
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	23	21.9%	71	67.6%	11	10.4%	105
25-44	32	15.2%	169	80.5%	9	4.3%	210
45-64	24	25.0%	70	72.9%	2	2.1%	96
65 and above	5	33.3%	9	60.0%	1	6.7%	15
Total	84	19.7%	319	74.9%	23	5.4%	426

Table 27. Impact on communication with doctors and nurses

When asked the same question about youth workers and social workers, the rate of distrust is higher (26.1% yes, compared to 55.8% no). This distrust is particularly prevalent among under 25s (35.2%) and the elderly (33.3%)— two age groups that are particularly often in contact with these professions.

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Are you more careful what you say to youth workers and social workers?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex – Muslim group							
Female	60	26.3%	129	56.1	39	17.1%	60
Male	51	25.8%	111	56.6	36	18.2%	51
Total	111	26.1%	240	56.3	75	17.2%	426
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	37	35.2%	49	46.7	19	18.1%	105
25-44	40	19.0%	128	61.0	42	20%	210
45-64	29	30.2%	56	58.3	11	11.5%	96
65 and above	5	33.3%	7	46.7	3	20%	15
Total	111	26.0%	240	56.2	75	17.8%	426

Table 28. Impact on communication with youth workers and social workers

Finally, to analyse the relationship of families to the public education system, we asked Muslim respondents whether they advise their children to "be careful what they say at school". 28.9% of the Muslim group, or almost a third, report that they do ask their children to be careful what they say, while 35.9% say they do not. However, if we look at the age group most concerned by this question—those aged 45-64 and most likely to be parents of children and teenagers—this "yes" rises to 41.7%, i.e., slightly less than half of the respondents, compared to 43.8% who say they do not ask their children to be careful.

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Do you ask your children to be careful what they say at school?"							
	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex – Muslim group							
Female	76	33.3%	84	36.8%	68	29.8%	228
Male	47	23.7%	69	34.8%	82	41.4%	198
Total	123	28.9%	153	35.9%	150	35.2%	426
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	11	10.5%	14	13.3%	80	76.2%	105
25-44	67	31.9%	93	44.3%	50	23.8%	210
45-64	40	41.7%	42	43.8%	14	14.6%	96
65 and above	5	33.3%	4	26.7%	6	40.0%	15
Total	123	28.9%	153	35.9%	150	35.2%	426

Table 29. Impact on freedom of expression at school

There is a fairly clear evidence of the chilling effect described above in relation to participation in charities: 36.9% agree that they "think twice before donating to a charity", while 51.9% say they do not.

Question: "In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits? Do you think twice before donating to a charity?"

	Yes		No		N/A		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	Total
Sex – Muslim group							
Female	91	39.9%	112	49.1%	25	11%	228
Male	66	33.3%	109	55.1%	23	11.6%	198
Total	157	36.9%	221	51.9%	48	11.3%	426
Age – Muslim group							
Under 25	29	27.6%	58	55.2%	18	17.1%	105
25-44	84	40%	111	52.9%	15	7.1%	210
45-64	38	39.6%	48	50%	10	10.4%	96
65 and above	6	40%	4	26.7%	5	33.3%	15
Total	157	36.9%	221	51.9%	48	11.3%	426

Table 30. Impact on giving to charity

Conclusion: impact on behaviour

When examining the impact of counter-terrorism on changes in the behaviour of Muslim populations, there are four aspects to consider. First, we must take into account one area where the impact is obvious: the feeling of being able to speak and express oneself freely. When 41.7% of Muslims aged 45-64 say they ask their children to "be careful what they say at school" to avoid being discriminated against, and nearly a third of Muslims say they self-censor, we can certainly speak of a significant impact. This is one of the oft-criticised effects of counter-terrorism in Western democracies: not a direct and coercive restriction of free expression, but the spread through society of ambient suspicion that causes self-censorship and self-restriction.[50] Also to be placed in this category are people's reservations about supporting charities, where the freedom to express political opinions is limited for fear of being associated with organisations described as "terrorist". Further investigation would be needed to determine more precisely which factors contribute to this self-censorship, since our survey only measures its extent.

Second, it is clear that the media plays an important role in the feeling of discrimination. This is evidenced by the very high proportion of Muslims who say they do not trust certain media outlet's treatment of information related to Islam or terrorism. Here, our survey is in

[50] In the same vein, see the conclusions of the CNCDH in its *Avis sur la prévention de la radicalisation*, 18 May 2017: http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/avis-sur-la-prevention-de-la-radicalisation.

accordance with a series of concurring studies on the role of certain media in the construction and spread of stereotypes and of confusion between Islam, the strict practice of Islam and terrorism. In this respect, this finding is no doubt less surprising than the others.

On the other hand—and this is the third point—only a small minority of respondents consider that counter-terrorism encroaches on their privacy. This finding is in line with those of the previous section: in terms of experience, perceptions and changes in habits, the privacy issue seems relatively separate and ultimately much less relevant than the question of discrimination. This finding should give academics and civil society organisations that focus on this point pause for thought. Obviously, we do not mean to question the work of sociologists, lawyers, and politicians who have highlighted the serious effect counter-terrorism policy has on civil liberties. Nevertheless, it is clear that this effect does not translate into a daily concern for the population: the ever-increasing limitation of rights should not be confused with people's perception or awareness of this limitation. For civil society organisations, this highlights, that privacy is far from people's main concern when it comes to counter-terrorism policies. This finding is particularly striking given the knowledge that an important part of the Muslim population considers itself specifically targeted by these policies.

The fourth and final point is that, contrary to what is reported in a number of qualitative studies, counter-terrorism does not seem to have a major impact on religious and political engagement.

V. DISCRIMINATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: EXPLANATORY MODELS

KEY POINTS

- Having experienced discrimination in the past five years systematically lowers scores for trust in institutions: the more someone has been discriminated against, the less trust they have in institutions.
- Although this general finding concerns both the control group and the Muslim group, it is systematically more pronounced among Muslims.
- The factor that significantly affects trust is not religion, age, social class or gender, but having been discriminated against.
- Muslims who have been subjected to discrimination are more likely to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures.
- Muslims' greater propensity to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures is therefore not due to their being Muslim, but to the fact that Muslims are over-represented among victims of discrimination.

The previous chapters have focused on providing a primarily descriptive overview of the survey using frequency tables and cross tabulations. In this chapter, we develop a statistical model to identify the factors that explain trust in institutions, the experience of discrimination in the past five years, and behavioural changes in response to counter-terrorism measures. Our aim is to answer the question posed at the beginning of this report on the link between discrimination and counter-terrorism.

As such, this chapter presents what is perhaps the most interesting finding of this survey, since it establishes a link between the experience of discrimination and behavioural changes in response to counter-terrorism. The link between discrimination and certain behaviours has been studied before with regard to trust in institutions.[51] We propose to extend this reflection to counter-terrorism through a series of questions about changes in behaviour. Whereas intuitively, one might think that factors such as age, socio-professional category, or religion would have a dominant influence on behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism, our analyses show that the main variable to explain behavioural change is the experience of discrimination over the last five years.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, we aim to identify the factors that explain trust in institutions. Next, we focus on explaining changes in behaviour in response to

[51] See EU-MIDIS II, *op. cit.*

counter-terrorism. Finally, we look directly at the determinants of discrimination within both the Muslim group and the control group.

Building a statistical model of analysis

The regression model we developed tests the impact of a series of explanatory factors (age, social class, sex, level of education, discrimination over the last five years, urban unit of residence, and religion) on the variables we are interested in, namely trust in institutions, changes in individual behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures, and experience of discrimination in the last five years.[52] The *reference categories* for all the estimated models are working class, male, no experience of discrimination in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25.[53]

Discrimination: the main factor in loss of trust in institutions

General considerations

Our first analysis seeks to explain the variation in trust in institutions. To do this, we applied our regression model to the ten institutions covered in the survey (police, school, intelligence services, Parliament, the army, council, government, social security, media and the justice system). As we will see below, these analyses show that experience of discrimination in the past five years is systematically associated with lower trust scores, to a statistically significant degree. And, as already mentioned, there is a much higher rate of discrimination among the Muslim group than the control group (see Table 31).

	Muslim group	Control group	Overall
No discrimination	41.9%	73.1%	58.7%
Discrimination	58.1%	26.9%	41.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	425	498	923

[52] In the last case, discrimination has the status of observed phenomenon rather than explanatory factor.

[53] The socio-professional classes, determined on the basis of the respondents' occupations, were grouped into five categories: business owners, directors and independent professionals; working classes (reference category: lower-level employees and workers in routine occupations); middle classes (intermediate occupations); upper classes (higher managerial and intellectual professionals); retired; and non-working. Level of education was grouped into four categories: compulsory (no qualifications, technical school certificate); secondary (technical, vocational or general school leaving qualification); tertiary I (two-year's of higher education); and tertiary II (Bachelor's, Master's or doctoral degree). The size of urban unit was grouped into four categories: rural municipality; small urban unit (from 2,000 to 49,999 inhabitants); large urban unit (from 50,000 to 1,999,999 inhabitants); and Paris. For the regression model explaining the experience of discrimination over the past five years, the religion variable was added.

Note: $p < 0.001$.

Table 31. Perceived experience of discrimination in the past five years

While this general trend concerns both the control group and the Muslim group, it is more pronounced among Muslims for all institutions except the local authority and social security; the rate of trust in these two institutions is lower among non-Muslims who have been discriminated against in the last five years. The only notable exception to the negative relationship between trust in institutions and discrimination is the case of the media, where the score for the control group is not statistically significant. For the sake of brevity, only the regressions for police and government are shown below.

Variation in trust in the police

If we consider each institution separately, different variables also prove significant. The table below, for example, shows the regression model for the level of trust in the police.

	Muslim group		Control group	
Constant	6.888 ***	(0.434)	6.154 ***	(0.316)
Age	0.024 *	(0.012)	0.011	(0.009)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	0.229	(0.663)	-0.544	(0.484)
Middle classes	-0.462	(0.486)	-0.093	(0.325)
Upper classes	0.425	(0.676)	-0.267	(0.381)
Non-working	0.187	(0.341)	0.643 *	(0.322)
Retired	-0.491	(0.801)	0.192	(0.377)
Female	0.231	(0.284)	0.337	(0.198)
Discriminated against in the last five years	-1.195 ***	(0.288)	-0.789 ***	(0.224)
Compulsory	0.218	(0.373)	0.069	(0.310)
Tertiary I	-0.118	(0.438)	0.336	(0.287)
Tertiary II	0.248	(0.370)	0.600 *	(0.248)
Rural municipality	0.252	(0.711)	-0.061	(0.271)
Small urban unit	-0.225	(0.394)	0.338	(0.240)
Paris	-0.385	(0.317)	0.121	(0.306)
N	393		488	
R2	0.075		0.078	
logLik	-941.165		-1045.113	
AIC	1914.330		2122.226	
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.				

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 32. Regression model for trust in the police

The results here show that, among Muslims, age has a certain impact on the variation in trust in the police and law enforcement. In the control group, it is having a university degree (Tertiary II) or not working that impacts the level of trust in the police.

Variation in trust in the government

Trust in the government increases with age in the control group, and with the level of education for both samples (see table below).

	Muslim group		Control group	
Constant	5.264 ***	(0.476)	3.383 ***	(0.388)
Age	0.012	(0.014)	0.025 *	(0.011)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	0.302	(0.731)	0.778	(0.587)
Middle classes	0.561	(0.534)	-0.107	(0.400)
Upper classes	0.346	(0.740)	0.342	(0.466)
Non-working	0.542	(0.374)	0.681	(0.391)
Retired	1.216	(0.851)	-0.005	(0.462)
Female	-0.411	(0.312)	0.278	(0.244)
Discriminated against in the last five years	-1.059 ***	(0.317)	-0.942 ***	(0.275)
Compulsory	0.368	(0.408)	0.278	(0.382)
Tertiary I	0.592	(0.489)	0.482	(0.355)
Tertiary II	0.970 *	(0.405)	1.303 ***	(0.304)
Rural municipality	-0.046	(0.785)	-0.217	(0.335)
Small urban unit	-0.299	(0.440)	0.286	(0.295)
Paris	0.005	(0.345)	0.642	(0.375)
N	374		472	
R2	0.080		0.110	
logLik	-920.935		-1101.276	
AIC	1873.871		2234.551	

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 33. Regression model for trust in the government

With regard to social security, being a woman and having a high level of education in the control group positively influences the level of trust, while conversely, being a Muslim woman has a negative effect on the trust score.

Trust in the media is the only area where the experience of discrimination is significant in the Muslim group and not in the control group. In the control group, trust increases with age, and is also higher among women and people living in Paris. Finally, for the justice system, only the "age", "non-working" and "Tertiary II" categories are associated with a higher level of trust. Notwithstanding these specific variations, the only variable that proves to have an impact in all the analyses is the discrimination variable.

Other variables are significant for the analysis of trust in other institutions. With regard to trust in the intelligence services, the experience of discrimination lowers the score among Muslims, while in the control group, trust is higher among non-working people and the most educated (Tertiary II). Representatives of the latter category also have more trust in Parliament. In the case of the army, it is interesting to note that in the control group, the upper classes express the least trust, while their Muslim counterparts express the most. With regard to trust in the council, the trust of the Muslim middle classes is in gradual decline (the reverse is true for the control group).

Discrimination: the main factor in behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism

To study the factors influencing participants' behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism measures, we applied our regression model to the questions presented in the previous chapter (detailed below). The regressions indicate that the factor most likely to influence behavioural change—indeed, the only statistically significant factor—is having experienced discrimination at least once in the past five years. We arrived at this conclusion through two stages of analysis. First, the regression model was used to analyse responses to the questions that both the Muslim and control groups were asked, and then to the questions only addressed to Muslims.

As specified in Chapter IV, the questions that all respondents were asked about behavioural changes in response to counter-terrorism measures had to do with freedom of expression, online behaviour, clothing, place of worship, and their relationship to the media. If we consider the cumulative figure of all respondents who have changed at least one of their behaviours, Muslims are more likely to have done so (47.3%) than the control group (40.4%). So, what explains this gap?

	Muslim group	Control group	Overall

No	52.7%	59.6%	56.4%
Yes	47.3%	40.4%	43.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	421	497	918

Note: $p < 0.001$.

Table 34. Changes in behaviour to avoid discrimination

The regression indicates that having experienced discrimination in the past five years is the main factor explaining changes in behaviour. This does not exclude other factors such as age, place of residence or social class, but these factors are not statistically significant. In other words, the analysis establishes a relationship between the experience of discrimination and behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism measures.

	Muslim group		Control group	
Constant	-0.464	(0.328)	-0.561	(0.314)
Age	0.007	(0.009)	-0.010	(0.009)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	-0.646	(0.510)	-0.087	(0.481)
Middle classes	-0.084	(0.369)	-0.413	(0.325)
Upper classes	-0.244	(0.517)	-0.488	(0.391)
Non-working	-0.061	(0.253)	-0.322	(0.318)
Retired	-0.578	(0.610)	0.113	(0.375)
Female	-0.056	(0.213)	0.264	(0.197)
Discriminated against in the last five years	0.725 ***	(0.217)	0.715 **	(0.219)
Compulsory	0.130	(0.277)	0.296	(0.304)
Tertiary I	-0.342	(0.332)	0.326	(0.284)
Tertiary II	-0.103	(0.281)	-0.092	(0.249)
Rural municipality	0.491	(0.543)	0.339	(0.269)
Small urban unit	0.099	(0.295)	0.020	(0.241)
Paris	-0.033	(0.238)	0.441	(0.299)
N	399		491	
logLik	-267.069		-319.227	
AIC	564.139		668.455	

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 35. Regression model for avoidance of discrimination

This relationship is backed up by cross-analysis of the variables of the experience of discrimination and behavioural change applied to the entire sample (by combining Muslims and control groups). To this effect, we can observe that while 36.4% of those who have changed their behaviour have not experienced discrimination in the last five years, among those who have experienced discrimination, the proportion that has changed their behaviour rises to 54.1%.

	No discrimination	Discrimination	Overall
No change in behaviour	63.6%	45.9%	56%
Change in behaviour	36.4%	54.1%	44%
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	569	425	994

Note: $p < 0.001$.

Table 36. Behavioural change according to experience of discrimination (Muslim and control groups)

Also of note is that, according to the regression model, the variation between the control group and the Muslim group is close to zero. If we compare the rates of behavioural change according to the experience of discrimination within the control group and the Muslim group, the distribution is almost identical (see Table 37). For example, while 37.3% of Muslims who have not been discriminated against still change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures, 35.7% of respondents in the same position within the control group do so as well.

	Discriminated (CG)	Discriminated (M)	Not discriminated (CG)	Not discriminated (M)	Overall
No change	46.3%	45.7%	64.4%	62.7%	56.4%
Change	53.7%	54.3%	35.6%	37.3%	43.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	134	243	362	177	916

Note: $p < 0.001$.

Table 37. Behavioural change according to experience of discrimination (Muslims discriminated against/not discriminated against and control group discriminated against/not discriminated against)

This result is also confirmed when we apply our model to the total population with the addition of the Muslim/non-Muslim variable. This suggests that being Muslim is not a factor that directly influences changes in behaviour in response to counter-terrorism.

Constant	-0.559 *	(0.239)
Age	-0.002	(0.006)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	-0.295	(0.346)
Middle classes	-0.254	(0.239)
Upper classes	-0.397	(0.304)
Non-working	-0.169	(0.195)
Retired	-0.128	(0.288)
Female	0.122	(0.142)
Discriminated against in the last five years	0.755 ***	(0.152)
Compulsory	0.212	(0.201)
Tertiary I	0.049	(0.213)
Tertiary II	-0.093	(0.183)
Rural municipality	0.317	(0.230)
Small urban unit	0.043	(0.183)
Paris	0.147	(0.184)
Muslim	-0.029	(0.168)
N	890	
logLik	-590.882	
AIC	1213.764	

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 36. Regression model for behavioural change according to experience of discrimination (Muslim and control groups together)

At first glance, this result may seem counter-intuitive given that, as mentioned above, Muslims are more likely to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures than the control group. This is what we might call a "composition effect", i.e., it is not being Muslim that influences behaviour, but the fact that Muslims are over-represented among those who have been discriminated against at least once in the past five years. In other words, Muslims are more likely to change their behaviour not because they are Muslim, but because they are more likely to experience discrimination. Conversely, this implies that Muslims who have not been discriminated against will react to counter-terrorism policies in the same way as their counterparts in the control group.

To further explore the link between the experience of discrimination and behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism, we applied the regression model to the ten questions addressed only to Muslim respondents (behaviour in relation to doctors, social workers, the media, schools, charity, political involvement and colleagues).

	Muslim group	
Constant	1.079 **	(0.415)
Age	0.000	(0.012)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	-0.957	(0.565)
Middle classes	0.388	(0.587)
Upper classes	-0.703	(0.609)
Non-working	-0.256	(0.332)
Retired	-0.175	(0.714)
Female	0.307	(0.278)
Discriminated against in the last five years	0.641 *	(0.275)
Compulsory	-0.160	(0.342)
Tertiary I	0.329	(0.452)
Tertiary II	0.247	(0.382)
Rural municipality	0.595	(0.811)
Small urban unit	0.163	(0.396)
Paris	-0.011	(0.300)
N	402	
logLik	-181.256	
AIC	392.512	

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 37. Regression model for change in habits (at least one of the ten habits, Muslim group)

82.4% of the Muslims surveyed report having changed at least one of these ten habits—a higher proportion than those observed for questions including the control group. Within this proportion of Muslim respondents, we find that, as in the total population, those who have experienced discrimination are more likely (86.1%) to change their behaviour than those who have not (77.1%).

	No discrimination	Discrimination	Overall

No change in behaviour	22.9%	13.9%	17.6%
Change in behaviour	77.1%	86.1%	82.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	175	245	420

Note: p < 0.001.

Table 38. Behavioural change (at least one of the ten habits) according to experience of discrimination in the last five years, Muslim group

Determinants of discrimination

The preceding analyses have identified the experience of discrimination as the main factor explaining both the loss of trust in institutions and the change in behaviour in response to counter-terrorism measures. We now turn to the factors that influence discrimination itself.

When the regression model is applied to the experience of discrimination in the past five years, the only two variables that have a significant influence on discrimination are being retired—which reduces the likelihood of facing discrimination—and being Muslim, which significantly increases the likelihood of experiencing discrimination.

Constant	-0.551 *	(0.243)
Age	-0.010	(0.007)
Business owners, directors & independent professionals	0.163	(0.347)
Middle classes	0.234	(0.244)
Upper classes	-0.447	(0.317)
Non-working	0.028	(0.200)
Retired	-1.099 **	(0.341)
Female	0.096	(0.152)
Compulsory	-0.151	(0.219)
Tertiary I	-0.157	(0.227)
Tertiary II	0.323	(0.196)
Rural municipality	-0.434	(0.263)
Small urban unit	0.010	(0.195)
Paris	-0.213	(0.191)
Muslim	1.074 ***	(0.168)
N	895	
logLik	-532.383	
AIC	1094.767	
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.		

Notes: the reference categories are: working class, male, not discriminated against in the last five years, secondary level of education, living in a large urban unit and aged 25. Binomial logistic regression.

Table 39. Regression model for discrimination (Muslim and control groups together)

This obviously does not exclude other factors such as gender, social class, or education as possible sources of discrimination. Our regression model simply shows that the "Muslim" variable is by far the most important when we consider the entire sample. For example, a focus on the education variable reveals differences in the rate of discrimination experience according to level of education within both samples. Yet for an equivalent level of education, there is no correspondence between the two groups. If we look at the most educated respondents (tertiary II), we see that 31.2% of the control group has experienced discrimination, whereas this is the case for 64.8% of the Muslim group—more than twice the proportion.

	Overall	Discriminated against	Not discriminated against

	%	N	%	N	%	N
Secondary	34,6%	147	63,3%	93	36,7%	54
Compulsory	22,8%	97	49,5%	48	50,5%	49
Tertiary I	12,9%	55	52,7%	29	47,3%	26
Tertiary II	24,7%	105	64,8%	68	35,2%	37
NA	4,9%	21	42,8%	9	57,2%	12
Total	100%	425	58,1%	247	41,9%	178

Table 40. Discrimination rates by level of education (Muslim group)

	Overall		Discriminated against		Not discriminated against	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Secondary	36,3%	181	23,2%	42	76,8%	139
Compulsory	13,7%	68	25%	17	75%	51
Tertiary I	17,1%	85	28,2%	24	71,8%	61
Tertiary II	31,5%	157	31,2%	49	68,8%	108
NA	1,4%	7	28,6%	2	71,4%	5
Total	100%	498	26,9%	134	73,1%	364

Table 41. Discrimination rates by level of education (control group)

This finding—that the Muslim variable is the main factor explaining discrimination—must, however, be qualified slightly if respondents' place of birth and the origins of their parents are considered. As mentioned earlier in the report (see Table 8), when Muslim respondents are asked about the reasons for the discrimination against them, they point first to origin or skin colour and to religion second. This is consistent with various studies on discrimination in France, which maintain that discrimination is first and foremost a "visible minority issue".[54]

The question remains whether Muslims are discriminated against as Muslims or as visible minorities. Not having asked respondents about their feelings of being perceived as a member of a visible minority (as the *Défenseur des droits* survey on discrimination at work does, for example), we do not have the data to answer it.[55] We are dealing here with a "composition effect" familiar to researchers who study discrimination and the attitudes of

[54] Beauchemin et al., *Op. cit.*, 131.

[55] Défenseur des Droits (2008), *op. cit.* We could have used the data on respondents' country of birth and that of their parents, but again, this would be to succumb to the bias of assigning physical characteristics on a questionably objectified basis.

racialised minorities towards the police.[56] When respondents' social characteristics correspond to several discriminated categories (Muslim religion, clothing, skin colour, accent), it is difficult to determine statistically which of these characteristics in particular explains the discrimination—especially given that in individuals' social experience, such a distinction is usually immaterial because the characteristics are present at the same time. As regards the results of the statistical models used in this study, and with the reservations raised above, in our opinion the "Muslim" category nonetheless remains relevant in explaining the feeling of discrimination.[57]

Conclusion: making discrimination central to the counter-terrorism debate

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the link between experiences of discrimination and counter-terrorism practices. We did so by developing a statistical model that enabled us to determine that the decline in trust in institutions and behavioural change in response to counter-terrorism measures are due primarily to one factor: the experience of discrimination.[58] Muslims' greater propensity to change their behaviour in response to counter-terrorism is therefore not due to their being Muslim, but to the fact that Muslims are over-represented among victims of discrimination. These findings suggest a need to revisit the terms of the relationship between counter-terrorism practices and discrimination. The latter is generally perceived as an effect of the former, but as this chapter in particular and the study in general demonstrate, the relationship is more complex. The prior existence of discrimination can foster reactions of distrust and self-isolation in the face of counter-terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMANDATIONS

The results of our survey underscore the importance of producing quantitative data on the effects of security policies on Muslims in France. The lack of such data undermines the understanding and impact of phenomena such as discrimination and the fight against terrorism. In our opinion, this type of survey should be reproduced using larger samples and a comparative approach to obtain more data on the impact of security policies on the

[56] Mirna Safi and Patrick Simon (2013), *op.cit.*: 245–275. Stephen Rice and Alex Piquero (2005), "Perceptions of Discrimination and Justice in New York City", *Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management*, 28 (1): 98-117 (cited in Roux Guillaume & Roché Sebastian (2016), "Police et phénomènes identitaires dans les banlieues : Entre ethnicité et territoire", *Revue Française de Science Politique* 66 (5).

[57] In a future survey, an effective way to distinguish the "Muslim" variable from characteristics associated with visible minorities (place of birth, accent, parents' origins) would be to establish a control group composed of respondents of "Muslim culture" (with at least one parent who is Muslim or was born in a country with a predominantly Muslim population), but who do not identify as Muslim.

[58] Our findings here are similar to those of the EU-MIDIS II survey.

feelings and attitudes of Muslims in France and Europe. Below we provide a series of conclusions and recommendations that reflect our survey findings.

1. Muslims in France must be considered as a heterogeneous population.

The working hypothesis upon which our survey was based was not neutral: that people in France who self-define as Muslim have a specific relationship to counter-terrorism policies. Our results highlight three points in this regard.

A diversified population. First, our findings confirm what a number of surveys have already shown: Muslims in France are not a homogeneous group. Within the Muslim population, people differ in their socio-professional categories, income, political orientation and religious practices. As we have highlighted, almost a quarter of people who self-identify as Muslims are non-practising. We must therefore dispute the image of an insular "community", supposedly confined to the suburbs of large French urban areas and prey to allegedly rampant radicalism.

A population no different in most respects. Our second observation is that on a large number of subjects, such as trust in institutions, the sense of security or the impact of counter-terrorism policies on their privacy, people who self-identify as "Muslim" are no different from the rest of the French population. They have as much trust as other French people in the Republic's major institutions, and expect to be protected from the threat of terrorism like everyone else.

A discriminated population. Although Muslims do not form a homogeneous group, they do have two important characteristics in common. On the one hand, our group of Muslim respondents are more likely to engage in regular religious practice. As we have seen, however, this has no influence on attitudes or behaviours. But the key point is that Muslim populations in France appear to be characterised by the experience of discrimination. While this is not specific to the "Muslim" group (since a significant number of respondents in the control group also report discrimination), Muslims are particularly affected. As we showed in Chapter V, the experience of discrimination explains two key patterns: the loss of trust in institutions and the change in behaviour in response to interaction with counter-terrorism policies.

2. Tackling discrimination will strengthen the legitimacy of counter-terrorism policies and their respect for civil liberties.

If we look at the issue of counter-terrorism more specifically, as this study does, it appears that the more a person has experienced discrimination, the more likely it is that he or she will perceive counter-terrorism policies as discriminatory. Muslims in France are particularly affected by discrimination—to a greater extent than the control group. Potential discrimination linked to counter-terrorism is difficult to distinguish from all the other forms of discrimination that Muslims face, particularly in their relations with the police. As our study shows, a considerable number of Muslims self-censor in public and change their habits for fear of being discriminated against. Counter-terrorism strategies should therefore

be combined with anti-discrimination initiatives. Such a two-pronged approach would be a means to mitigate the negative effects on the population such as fear and self-isolation that counter-terrorism may induce. **Any improvement in the impact of counter-terrorism policies depends on reducing the considerable exposure of Muslim populations to discrimination.**

3. Tackling discrimination must be a priority if Muslims' trust in French political and social institutions is to be maintained.

In seeking to understand the effects of counter-terrorism policies on discrimination, we assessed the extent of the discrimination faced by Muslims in France—more than half have been discriminated against. With the same questionnaire, we measured Muslims' level of trust in French state and social institutions, which proves as high or higher than the control group for almost all the institutions. Finally, in our explanatory model (Chapter 5), we showed that experience of discrimination is the main variable that significantly reduces trust in institutions. **Muslim populations share a high level of trust in French institutions, which is eroded when they face discrimination. Putting an end to this is an urgent priority.**

4. Reflection is needed on how to build more equable relations between the police and the public.

Our study shows that Muslims feel strongly discriminated against in interactions with the police. This feeling goes beyond interactions related to counter-terrorism; many studies have brought the problem to light, particularly with regard to more common interactions such as police stops. More generally, it concerns visible minorities and specific neighbourhoods. In the context of counter-terrorism, two aspects are considered particularly discriminatory: the way people are treated during interactions with the police and the way they are selected for stopping and questioning. Yet police legitimacy in terms of counter-terrorism depends on its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. **Finding ways to improve patterns of interaction between Muslim populations and the police should be made a priority, in order to guarantee the safety of all while reducing the feeling of ill-treatment and unfair targeting. A greater focus on these issues during police training would be a good place to start.**

5. The media have a role to play in combating prejudice about the link between Islam and terrorism.

Finally, our study highlights a phenomenon that is already well documented: the effect of media coverage of Islam in relation to terrorism, which significantly reinforces the collective feeling of discrimination among Muslims. We need more collective thinking on how the media can help combat prejudiced ideas about Islam and terrorism, and about the image of Muslims in France more generally. Our survey shows that Muslims are losing trust in the media, yet it is one of the foundations of democratic debate and civic participation.

Further reflection is needed on the media's treatment of Muslim populations and Islam when it comes to counter-terrorism, to prevent feelings of discrimination.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Action Droit des Musulmans (ADM) (2017), *Avis sur le projet de loi renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme*, 28 September 2017: http://adm1.unblog.fr/2017/09/28/adm-avis-sur-le-projet-de-loi-renforcant-la-securite-interieure-et-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme/ (consulted on 20 September 2018).

Adida, Claire, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort (2010), "Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays ? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail", *Rapport de la Fondation franco-américaine et de Sciences Po*, Paris, Sciences Po.

Amiraux, Valérie (2001), *Acteurs de l'islam entre Allemagne et Turquie : Parcours militants et expériences religieuses*, Paris, Editions L'Harmattan.

Amnesty international (2017), *Des mesures disproportionnées, L'ampleur grandissante des politiques sécuritaires dans les pays de l'UE est dangereuse*: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0153422017FRENCH.PDF.

Awan, Imran (2012), ""I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist": How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a 'Suspect' Community", *Politics & Policy* 40 (6): 1158–1185.

Baubérot, Jean (2018), "L'ouvrage « La tentation radicale » d'O. Galland et d'A. Muxel : une enquête défectueuse", in "Blog : Laïcité et regard critique sur la société", *Médiapart* (10 April) https://blogs.mediapart.fr/jean-bauberot/blog/100418/l-ouvrage-la-tentation-radicale-d-o-galland-et-d-muxel-une-enquete-defectueuse (consulted on 28 September 2018).

Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon (2010), "Trajectoires et Origines : Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France - Premiers résultats", in *Enquête TeO,* INED, October 2010.

Beauchemin, Cris, Christelle Hamel and Patrick Simon (2016), "Trajectoires et Origines : Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France", Paris, INED éditions.

Benbassa, Esther and Catherine Troendlé (2017), "Rapport final de la mission d'information sur le désendoctrinement, le désembrigadement et la réinsertion des djihadistes en France et en Europe", *Commission des Lois du Sénat*, 12 July 2017: http://www.senat.fr/espace_presse/actualites/201707/rapport_final_de_la_mission_dinformation_sur_le_desendoctrinement_le_desembrigadement_et_la_reinsertion_des_djihadistes_en_france_et_en_europe.html (consulted on 28 August 2018).

Blackwood, Leda, Nick Hopkins and Stephen Reicher (2016), "From theorizing radicalization to surveillance practices: Muslims in the cross hairs of scrutiny", *Political Psychology*, vol. 37 (5): 597-612.

Body-Gendrot, Sophie (2013), "Immigration, Islam, and the Politics of Belonging in France, A Comparative Framework", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 36 (7): 1257–1258.

Brittain, Victoria (2009), "Besieged in Britain", *Race & Class,* 50 (3): 1–29.

Brouard, Sylvain and Vincent Tiberj (2005), *Français comme les autres : Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, Paris, Presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques.

Brubaker, Rogers (2013), "Categories of analysis and categories of practice: A note on the study of Muslims in European countries of immigration", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, n°1, 36 (1): 1-8.

Brubaker, Rogers and Frederick Cooper (2000), "Beyond 'Identity'", *Theory and Society*, 29 (1): 1-47.

Camilleri, Raphaelle (2012), *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report*, London, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Cesari, Jocelyne (2002), "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority", in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.), *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens,* Oxford University Press, 36-51.

Césari, Jocelyne (2004), *L'islam à l'épreuve de l'occident*, Paris, La Découverte.

Choudhury, Tufyal and Helen Fenwick (2011), "*The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Muslim Communities*", *International Review of Law, Computers & Technology*, 25 (3): 151-181.

CNCDH (2018) *La lutte contre le racisme, l'antisemitisme et la xenophobie - Année 2017*. Paris. La Documentation Française

Collectif contre l'islamophobie en France (CCIF) (2018), *Rapport sur l'islamophobie pendant l'année 2017 : Dates, chiffres et questions*: http://www.islamophobie.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ccif-rapport-2018.pdf (Consulted on 20 September 2018).

Défenseur des droits (2018), *11e baromètre de la perception des discriminations dans l'emploi*, Paris, 27 September 2018: https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etudresult-harcmoral-a4-num-30.08.18.pdf (Consulted on 28 September 2018).

Deltombe, Thomas (2013), *L'islam imaginaire : la construction médiatique de l'islamophobie en France*, *1975-2005*, Paris, La Découverte.

El Karoui, Hakim (2016), "Un islam français est possible", Report, in *Institut Montaigne*, Paris, September 2016.

Etienne, Bruno (2003), *Islam, les questions qui fâchent*, Paris, Bayard.

European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2018) *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey*. Luxembourg, Publication Office. http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2015/eu-midis-ii-second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey.

Fekete, Liz (2004), "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State", *Race & Class* 46 (1): 3–29.

Frégosi, Franck (2008), *Penser l'islam dans la laicité*, Paris, Fayard.

Galland, Olivier and Anne Muxel (eds.) (2018), *La tentation radicale. Enquête auprès des lycéens*, Paris, PUF, 2018.

Geisser, Vincent (1997), *Ethnicité républicaine: les élites d'origine maghrébine dans le système politique français*, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po.

Geisser, Vincent (2003), *La Nouvelle Islamophobie*, Sur le vif, Paris, La Découverte.

Geisser, Vincent and Aziz Zemouri (2007), *Marianne et Allah. Les politiques français face à la question musulmane*, Paris, La Découverte.

Greer, Steven (2010), "Anti-Terrorist Laws and the United Kingdom's "Suspect Muslim Community": A Reply to Pantazis and Pemberton", *British Journal of Criminology*, 50 (6): 1171–1190.

Hajjat, Abdellali and Marwan Mohammed (2013), *Islamophobie. Comment les élites françaises construisent le "problème musulman"*, Paris, La Découverte.

Haverig, Anika (2013), "Managing Integration: German and British Policy Responses to the 'Threat from Within' Post-2001", *Journal of International Migration and Integration,* 14 (2): 345-362.

Heath-Kelly, Charlotte (2012), "Reinventing Prevention or Exposing the Gap? False Positives in UK Terrorism Governance and the Quest for Pre-Emption", *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5 (1): 69–87.

Jarvis, Lee and Michael Lister (2013), "Disconnected Citizenship? The Impacts of Counter-terrorism Policy on Citizenship in the UK", *Political Studies,* Vol. 61-3: 656–675.

Jeanne, Ludovic (2017), "Les enjeux du recrutement pour les services de renseignement français", *The Conversation*, 6 June 2017: https://theconversation.com/les-enjeux-du-recrutement-pour-les-services-de-renseignement-francais-78505 (consulted on 30 May 2018).

Jeldtoft, Nadia (2011), "Lived Islam: Religious Identity with 'Non-Organized' Muslim Minorities", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, n°1, 34 (7): 1134-51.

Jenkins, Richard (2014), *Social identity*, New York, Routledge.

Jobard, Fabien and René Lévy (eds.) (2009), *Police et minorités visibles : le contrôle d'identité à Paris*, New York, Open Society Institute: http://www.cnrs.fr/inshs/recherche/docs-actualites/rapport-facies.pdf.

Jounot, Yann (2016), "Prévention de la radicalisation", Rapport SGDSN, in *Mediapart*, "Terrorisme : un rapport confidentiel-défense condamnait en 2013 le tout-sécuritaire", 11 January 2016: https://static.mediapart.fr/files/2016/01/12/295128767-rapport-jounot.pdf (consulted on 26 May 2018).

Kastoryano, Riva (2004), "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany", *International Migration Review,* 38 (3): 1234–1255.

Kepel, Gilles (1987), *Les banlieues de l'islam*, Paris, Le seuil.

Kundnani, Arun (2009), *Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism*, London, Institute of Race Relations.

Laurence, Jonathan and Justin Vaisse (2007), *Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France*, Brookings Institution Press.

Laurence, Jonathan and Justin Vaïsse (2007), *Intégrer l'islam : la France et ses musulmans, enjeux et réussites*, Paris, Odile Jacob.

Leveau, Rémy, Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (eds.) (2001*), L'islam en France et en Allemagne : identités et citoyennetés,* Paris, La Documentation Française.

Louati, Yasser (2015), "L'Exception Francaise: From Irrational Fear of Muslims to their Social Death Sentence», *Islamophobia Studies Journal,* Vol. 3 (1): 90-105.

Maussen, Marcel (2006), "Representing and Regulating Islam in France and in the Netherlands", *Muslims in Europe and in the United States Conference*, Harvard University, 15-16 December.

Mcdonald, Laura Zahra (2011), "Securing Identities, Resisting Terror: Muslim Youth Work in the UK and its Implications for Security", *Religion, State and Society*, 39 (2-3): 177-189.

McGovern, Mark and Angela Tobin (2010), *Countering Terror or Counter-Productive: Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-insurgency Law and Policy*, Ormskirk, Edge Hill University.

MONITOR, Global Intelligence on Racism: http://monitoracism.eu.

Mythen, Gabe and Sandra Walklate (2009), "'I'm a Muslim, But I'm Not a Terrorist': Victimization, Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety", *British Journal of Criminology,* 49 (6): 736-754.

Mythen, Gabe, Sandra Walklate and Fatima Khan (2012), "'Why Should We Have to Prove We're Alright?": Counter-terrorism, Risk and Partial Securities", *Sociology*, vol. 47 (2): 383-398.

Mythen, Gabe, Sandra Walklate and Elizabeth Jane Peatfield (2017), "Assembling and Deconstructing Radicalisation in PREVENT: A Case of Policy-Based Evidence Making?", *Critical Social Policy*, SAGE Publications UK: London, 37 (2): 180–201.

Observatoire de l'Islamophobie: https://observatoireislamophobie.wordpress.com/ (consulted on 20 September 2018).

Pantazis, Christina and Simon Pemberton (2009), "From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation", *British Journal of Criminology*, Oxford University Press 49 (5): 646–666.

Peter, Frank (2008), Political Rationalities, "Counter-terrorism and Policies on Islam in the United Kingdom and France", in Julia M. Eckert (ed.), *The Social Life of Counter-terrorism Laws: The War on Terror and the Classifications of the "Dangerous Others",* Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 79–108.

Poynting, Scott and Barbara Perry (2007), "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia Since 9/11", *Current Issues Criminal Justice*, HeinOnline, 19 (2): 360-380.

Ragazzi, Francesco (2014), *Vers un" multiculturalisme policier"?: la lutte contre la radicalisation en France, aux Pays Bas et au Royaume-Uni*, Centre d'études et de recherches internationales, Paris.

Ragazzi, Francesco (2016), "Suspect Community or Suspect Category? The Impact of Counter-Terrorism as 'Policed Multiculturalism'", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 42 (5): 724-741.

Ragazzi, Francesco (2017), "Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation: Securitising Social Policy?", *Critical Social Policy*, vol. 37-2: 163-179.

Rice, Stephen K. and Alex Piquero (2005), "Perceptions of Discrimination and Justice in New York City", *Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategy and Management*, 28 (1): 98-117.

Rigouste, Mathieu (2014), *L'ennemi intérieur : la généalogie coloniale et militaire de l'ordre sécuritaire dans la France contemporaine*, Paris, La Découverte.

Roux, Guillaume and Sebastian Roché (2016), "Police et phénomènes identitaires dans les banlieues : Entre éthnicité et territoire", *Revue Française de Science Politique,* 66 (5).

Roux, Guillaume (2017), "Expliquer le rejet de la police en banlieue : discriminations, "ciblage des quartiers" et racialisation. Un état de l'art", *Droit et société*, 97 (3).

Safi, Mirna and Patrick Simon (2013), "Les discriminations ethniques et raciales dans l'enquête Trajectoires et Origines représentations, expériences subjectives et situations vécues", *Economie et statistique,* 464 (1): 245–275.

Sbai, Jalila (2018), "Un projet aux relents coloniaux pour l'islam de France – 'L'islam, une religion française' de Hakim El-Karoui", *Orient XXI*, 9 March: https://orientxxi.info/lu-vu-entendu/un-projet-aux-relents-coloniaux-pour-l-islam-de-france,2325 (Consulted on 28 September 2018).

Simon, Patrick and Vincent Tiberj (2013), *Sécularisation ou regain religieux : La religiosité des immigrés et de leurs descendants*, Paris, Institut national d'études démographiques.

Spalek, Basia and Alia Imtoual (2007), "Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror Responses: 'Hard' Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 27 (2): 185–202.

Venel, Nancy (2004), *Musulmans et citoyens*, Paris, PUF.

Vertigans, Stephen (2010), "British Muslims and the UK Government's 'War on Terror' Within: Evidence of a Clash of Civilizations or Emergent De-Civilizing Processes?", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61(1): 26–44.

Zauberman, Renée (2015), "Les enquêtes de victimation. Une brève histoire, quelques usages", *Idées économiques et sociales*, vol. 181 (3): 8-21.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank all those who contributed to this report. First of all, we are grateful to the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) for funding this study, particularly Debora Guidetti, Clara Grosset and Cristina Goñi who supported us throughout the project. Tufyal Choudhury and Quirine Eijkman took part in the initial phase of the research. At the Centre d'Etudes pour les Conflits, Liberté et Sécurité (CCLS) we had the support of Didier Bigo, Laurent Bonelli and Amandine Scherrer. We also would like to thank the EU Fp7 SOURCE Network of Excellence for funding the English version of this report, especially J. Peter Burgess for his support. The study was made possible by the warm welcome that Francesco Ragazzi received at CERI as an associate researcher—many thanks to CERI director Alain Dieckhoff and to Corinne Deloy, Coralie Meyer, Karolina Michel and Joëlle Saïz for their hard work and support. In Geneva, Matteo Gianni and InCite supported and backed the team and Elisa Banfi's help was crucial. The questionnaire for the study could not have been designed without the comments and criticism of the advisory committee, composed of Sihame Assbague, Nadia Benmoussa, Samia Hathroubi, Yasser Louati, Nonna Mayer, Dhaou Meskine and Moungi Rouaiguia. Jérôme Fourquet at IFOP also helped us to perfect our questions and make them workable. Thanks to Capucine Laurent and Marie-Emmanuelle Ragazzi for their attentive, indispensable proofreading of the French version. Finally, we would like to thank the people who kindly agreed to read an earlier version of the report and helped us make substantial improvements: Sylvain Antichan, Erika Campelo, Jean-Marie Fardeau, Dominique Nogueres, Guillaume Roux, Jeanne Sulzer and Sihem Zine.

APPENDIX 1. QUESTIONNAIRE

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

RS1. Sex of the respondent

1. Male
2. Female

RS2. How old are you?

RS2TER. What is your current employment status?

1. In paid employment (including paid apprenticeships and work placements)
3. In unpaid employment
4. Student
5. Unemployed having worked before
6. Unemployed and looking for your first job
7. Retired
8. Homemaker
9. Other (military, unable to work, etc.)

RS3. What is your main occupation?

1. Farmer
2. Business owner or director / independent professional
3. Higher managerial / intellectual professional
4. Intermediate occupations (school teacher, mid-level health worker, mid-level civil servant, mid-level clerical, sales or service employee, technician, line supervisor)
5. Lower-level employee (clerical, sales or services, police or military personnel)
6. Worker in a routine occupation (skilled or unskilled manual worker, driver, farm worker)
7. Retired
8. Other not in work

The following questions are about religion. You can say that you don't know or decline to answer.

RS5. In terms of religion, would you say you are…?

1. Catholic
2. Protestant
3. Muslim
4. Orthodox
5. Jewish
6. Other religion
7. No religion
8. (Decline to answer)
9. (Don't know)

RS6. Would you say your mother is…?

Filter: for everyone

1. Catholic
2. Protestant
3. Muslim
4. Orthodox
5. Jewish
6. Other religion
7. No religion
8. (Decline to answer)
9. (Don't know)
10. (Don't know / Mother unknown, deceased or estranged)

RS7. Would you say your father is…?

Filter: for everyone

1. Catholic
2. Protestant
3. Muslim
4. Orthodox
5. Jewish
6. Other religion
7. No religion
8. (Decline to answer)
9. (Don't know)
10. (Don't know / Father unknown, deceased or estranged)

RS20. Do you hold...?

More than one response is possible, i.e., 1 and 3 or 2 and 3
Filter: for everyone

1. French citizenship by birth
2. French citizenship by naturalisation
3. Citizenship of another country

RS20bis. Which is your country of nationality?

Filter: to foreigners

1. Algeria
2. Morocco
3. Tunisia
4. Turkey
5. An African country (excluding Algeria/Tunisia/Morocco)
6. A country in Europe (excluding Turkey)
7. Another country

End of screening

PART I. GENERAL QUESTIONS (A)

A1. Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life at the moment? Please indicate your level of satisfaction on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 meaning that you are not at all satisfied and 10 that you are completely satisfied.

Filter: for everyone

	Not at all satisfied										**Completely satisfied**	Don't know	Decline to answer
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
Level of satisfaction	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

A2. Please indicate your level of trust in each of the following institutions on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 meaning you don't trust them at all and 10 meaning you trust them completely.

Filter: for everyone

	No trust										**Trust**	Don' t know	Decline to answer
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
The police and gendarmerie	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
School	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Intelligence services	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Parliament (National Assembly and Senate)	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
The army	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Your council	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
The French president and government	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
Social security													
Mainstream media (Le Monde, France 2, etc.)	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
The justice system	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

PART II. EXPERIENCES OF DISCRIMINATION

SOCIETAL DISCRIMINATION (B)

Now we would like to ask about several areas of life where you may have experienced discrimination. By discrimination we mean By discrimination we mean any form of treatment that has favoured or disadvantaged you on the grounds of one or more personal characteristics or choices—whether real or perceived—such as your origin, nationality, ethnicity or religion.

B3. B3. Over the past five years, have you experienced discrimination…?

Filter: for everyone Possible responses: Yes, No, Does not apply (suggested)

1. At work or when looking for a job
2. In the street or on public transport
3. When looking to buy or rent a flat or a house
4. When visiting a doctor or hospital
5. When interacting with teachers or staff at school
6. When stopped by police in the street, when driving, in public transport or on a trip

B4. [For each response ticked in the previous question]. In your opinion, what was the main reason?

Filter: if at least one "Yes" in B3

1. Your age
2. Your gender
3. Your sexual orientation
4. Your origin or skin colour
5. Your religion
6. Other: please specify (open)

B5. During the incident(s), were negative comments made to you about…

Filter: if at least one "Yes" in B3 Possible responses: Yes, No.

1. Immigration
2. Criminality
3. Terrorism
4. Other (please specify)

EXPERIENCE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-RADICALISATION (C)

In the last few years, several measures have been adopted to combat:

- terrorism, including arrests, stricter border controls, house arrests, deportations and internet surveillance
- radicalisation: including a toll-free number, a website called stop-djihadisme.fr and deradicalisation centres.

We would like to hear about your experience with these government policies.

C6. In the past five years, in connection with counter-terrorism or counter-radicalisation activities, have you been:

Filter: for everyone

	Yes	**No**	Don't know	Decline to answer
In contact with youth workers	□	□	□	□
In contact with social workers	□	□	□	□
Stopped and questioned by police, gendarmerie, custom officials, or other law enforcement officers	□	□	□	□

C7. Thinking back, can you indicate how justified you think the contact or stop was on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 meaning the contact was totally unjustified and 10 that it was totally justified.

Filter: if "Yes" to each possibility in C6

	0 ...	**...10**	98	99
Your contact with youth workers	□	□	□	□
Your contact with social workers	□	□	□	□
Your dealings with police, gendarmerie, customs officials, etc.	□	□	□	□

C8. Overall, on a scale of 0 to 10, how do you think you were treated? 0 means you were treated very badly and 10 means you were treated very well.

Filter: if at least one "Yes" in C6

Badly treated									**Well treated**		Don't know	Decline to answer
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

C9. How do you think you were selected for these interactions?

Filter: if at least one "Yes" in C6

1. Randomly
2. Deliberately

C10. What do you think is the reason you were chosen? Because of... (several responses may be given)

Filter: if C9=2

1. Your origin
2. Your skin colour
3. You religion
4. Your clothing
5. Your age
6. Your gender
7. Your sexual orientation
8. Other: please specify

PART III. PERCEPTIONS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-RADICALISATION POLICIES

EFFECTIVENESS AND PROPORTIONALITY (D)

D11. Over the past five years, the authorities have taken action to deal with terrorism. Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 how much these measures have contributed to your sense of security, 0 meaning that these measures have not made you fee safe at all, and 10 that they have made you feel completely safe.

Filter: for everyone

	Not safe at all										**Completely safe**	Don' t know	Decline to answer
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
Sense of security	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

D12. Again on a scale of 0 to 10, please indicate how much you think the authorities' counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures have encroached on your privacy, 0 meaning that these measures have had no impact on your privacy, and 10 meaning that they have seriously encroached on your privacy.

Filter: for everyone

	No impact										**Seriously encroached**	Don' t know	Decline to answer
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
Encroachment on privacy	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

D13. Do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the measures the authorities have taken in relation to terrorism and counter-radicalisation over the last five years.

Filter: for everyone Possible responses: "Totally agree"; "mostly agree"; "mostly disagree"; "totally disagree"

1. These measures have targeted certain groups or communities
2. These measures have targeted certain people

D14. In the last five years, do you think the authorities' counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures have mainly targeted...?

Filter: If the response to D13 is "Totally agree"; "mostly agree". Two responses are possible for 1 to 4.

1. People of a specific origin.
2. People from a specific religious group.
3. People from specific neighbourhoods.
4. Specific places, such as community centres or mosques.
5. None of the above.

D15. On a scale of 0 to 10, please indicate how justified this targeting seems to you, 0 meaning it is totally unjustified and 10 meaning it is totally justified.

Filter: If the response to question D14 corresponds to possibilities 1 to 4

Totally unjustified										**Totally justified**	Don't know	Decline to answer
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

PART IV. EFFECTS OF MEASURES ON INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR

We would now like to find out what consequences these measures have had for you.

E16. To avoid potential discrimination...

Filter: for everyone Possible responses "Yes", "No", "Does not apply to you".

1. Do you avoid saying what you think about foreign policy issues such as conflicts abroad (online or on social media, at work, or in other social contexts)?
2. Do you avoid saying what you think about controversial social issues (online or on social media, at work, or in other social contexts)?
3. Have you changed your internet habits (stopped using certain applications, changed email providers, or used encryption)?
4. Have you changed the way you dress or your appearance?
5. Have you changed your place of worship?

E17. In the current context, do you think you have changed any of your habits?

Filter: only respondents who said they were Muslim in question RS5. Possible responses "Yes", "No", "Does not apply to you".

1. Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you think they misrepresent the Muslim community?
2. Have you stopped reading or watching certain media outlets because you don't trust their information on terrorism and counter-terrorism?
3. Are you more careful what you say to doctors and nurses?
4. Are you more careful what you say to youth workers and social workers?
5. Do you ask your children to be careful what they say at school?
6. Are you more involved in religious or spiritual organisations?
7. Are you more involved in local or national politics?
8. Do you think twice before donating to a charity?
9. Are you more careful what you say to your colleagues at work and others around you?

PART V. PERSONAL INFORMATION

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

RS8. May I ask what country your father was born in?

RS9. And what country your mother was born in?

RS10. And what country were you born in? In what year?

RS11. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?

1. No schooling completed
2. Primary school
3. French National Diploma (Brevet des colleges) – end of Year 10 ≈ GCSE
4. Technical school certificate (CAP, BEP) or equivalent
5. Technical or vocational *baccalauréat* (school leaving qualification) or equivalent
6. General *baccalauréat* (school leaving qualification) or equivalent
7. Two year's of higher education (DEUG, DUT, BTS)
8. Bachelor's degree or Bachelor with Honours degree
9. Master's degree or PhD
10. Decline to answer
11. Don't know

RS12. What was the main language spoken in your family when you were a child?

Filter: for everyone (Pre-coded responses, not suggested)

1. French
2. A regional language
3. Spanish
4. Italian
5. Arabic
6. Another language

RS13. Could you please indicate, approximately, your household's net monthly income? By "household", we mean all the people living under the same roof as you.

Filter: for everyone

1. Less than €1,000
2. €1,000 to €1,999
3. €2,000 to €3,999
4. €4,000 to €6,999
5. €7,000 or more

RELIGIOUS CHARACTERISTICS

G18. Regardless of your religious affiliation, how religious would you say you are on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 meaning you are not religious at all and 10 meaning you are very religious?

Filter: for everyone

Not religious at all									**Very religious**		Don't know	Decline to answer
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

G19. Apart from when you are at religious services, how often do you pray?

Filter: for everyone

1. Every day
2. More than once a week
3. Once a week
4. At least once a month
5. Only on religious holidays
6. Less often
7. Never

G20. Do you wear clothing in public that indicates your religion (e.g., a headscarf for a women, a turban or skull cap for a man)?

Filter: for everyone

1. Yes, always / most of the time
2. Yes, but only on specific occasions
3. No, never

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (H)

H21. Which political party do you feel closest to, or the least distant from?

Filter: for everyone (List up to date on 1 January 2018)

1. Lutte Ouvrière
2. Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste
3. Parti Communiste
4. La France Insoumise
5. Génération.s
6. Parti Socialiste
7. Europe Ecologie Les Verts
8. La République en Marche
9. MoDem
10. Le mouvement Radical
11. UDI (Union des Démocrates et Indépendants)
12. Agir, la droite constructive
13. Les Républicains (former UMP)
14. Debout La France
15. Union Populaire Républicaine
16. Les Patriotes
17. Front National
18. Another party: please specify
19. No party

CENTRE D'ÉTUDE SUR LES CONFLITS,
LIBERTE, SECURITE (CCLS)

PARIS 2019